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Supreme Court Voting Behavior
2003 Term
by RICHARD G. WILKINS *, SCOTT WORTHINGTON **,
LORIANNE UPDIKE ***, JACOB REYNOLDS ****
I. Introduction
This Study, the eighteenth in a series,' tabulates and analyzes the
voting behavior of the United States Supreme Court during the 2003
Term. The analysis is designed to determine whether individual Jus-
tices and the Court as a whole are voting more "conservatively,"
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
** J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1999.
* J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2005.
**** J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2006.
1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this Study with Supreme Court Voting Behav-
ior:1986 Term, 2 BYU J. PUB. L. 15 (1988). Professor Richard G. Wilkins continued the
Study in Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1992) [hereinafter
1991 Study]. The last ten Studies, analyzing the 1993 to 2002 terms, have been published in
the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. See Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court
Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269 (1995) [hereinafter 1993 Study];
Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1994 Term, 23 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Be-
havior: 1995 Term, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 Study]; Richard G.
Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1996 Term, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35
(1997) [hereinafter 1996 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1997 Term, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 533 (1999) [hereinafter 1997 Study]; Richard G. Wil-
kins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1998 Term, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 423
(2000) [hereinafter 1998 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1999 Term, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543 (2001) [hereinafter 1999 Study]; Richard G. Wil-
kins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2000 Term, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247
(2002) [hereinafter 2000 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
2001 Term, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307 (2003) [hereinafter 2001 Study]; Richard G. Wil-
kins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2002 Term, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 497
(2005) [hereinafter 2002 Study].
2. The 2003 United States Supreme Court Term covers decisions made from October
2003 through June 2004.
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more "liberally," or about the same when compared with past Terms.
As in politics, whether a judicial trend is "conservative" or "liberal"
often lies in the eye of the beholder. On such a point, members of the
American Civil Liberties Union and the Federalist Society for Law
and Public Policy Studies might well disagree.
This Study attempts to remove this subjectivity by applying the
following consistent classification scheme to ten categories of cases
across time: "conservative" votes are those that favor an assertion of
governmental power, while "liberal" votes are those that favor a
claim of individual liberty.3 By tracking the term-to-term conserva-
tive or liberal changes in the voting patterns of individual Justices and
the Court as a whole across these categories of cases,' and by applying
standard statistical tests to the resulting data,5 this Study attempts to
provide reliable information regarding the current ideological posture
of the Court and its members, as well as conclusions and projections
regarding its past and future trends. Whether statistical analysis of a
complex and subjective process (like judicial decision-making) pro-
vides useful information may well be debatable.6 But, within the limi-
tations inherent in an attempt to "number crunch" ideology, this an-
nual survey offers students and practitioners information that is
useful for assessing how the Court or an individual Justice has voted
- and may vote in the future - in particular categories of cases.
For the 2003 Term, seven of the Study's ten Tables demonstrate
liberal movement in the outcome of Majority Opinions (as compared
3. There is no single, settled definition of conservatism or liberalism. See generally
M.A. RIFF, DICTIONARY OF MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIEs 67-73, 141-52 (1987) (dis-
cussing various possible interpretations of the terms). This Study's definitions, however, are
close to the core ideals of each ideology. See id. at 67 (noting that conservatism "implies
fear of sudden and violent change[s], respect for established institutions and rulers, support
for elites and hierarchies and a general mistrust of theory as opposed to empirical deduc-
tions"); see also id. at 142 (asserting that "twentieth century" liberalism is "compounded of
constitutionalism; doubtful[ ] of pluralism; certain[ ] of a belief in the virtues of economic
freedom, and less certain[ ] of a desire to restrict government intervention in most other as-
pects of life").
4. See infra Data Tables 1-10.
5. See infra Appendix B.
6. The general reliability of statistical inference depends on random sampling. See gen-
erally Robert V. Hogg & Allen T. Craig, Introduction to Mathematical Statistics 157-58 (5th
ed. 1994); Raymond H. Myers, Classical and Modern Regression with Applications 9-11 (2d
ed. 1990). The Court's method of selecting cases is far from random. Rather, it is the result
of a conscious decisional process. Furthermore, reliable statistics generally require large
quantities of information to produce reliable results. As sample sizes become larger, infer-
ences become more accurate. This Study is subject to sampling bias, both because the sam-
ple is not random and because it is comparatively small. The statistical inferences below,
therefore, may not accurately represent a Justice's (or the Court's) views.
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with outcomes from the prior Term).' Last Term, six Tables demon-
strated liberal movement.8 Accordingly, the liberal trend noted last
year may have continued. Any such conclusion, however, is compli-
cated by evidence of conservative momentum in 2003, including con-
servative patterns on three Tables that statistical testing (i.e., factor
analysis) suggests are reasonably reliable evidence of ideological
bias.'
Last Term we noted a "seesaw" pattern in the trends identified
by this Study. ° In 2003, this conservative-to-liberal-to-conservative-
and-back-again movement (evident for the past four Terms) falters
(at least temporarily)." The ideological tilt of the Court in 2003 is
rather unclear. Based on the data, one could plausibly assert that
2003 Term voting patterns suggest either (a) a Court in transition,
moving from a generally conservative to a somewhat more liberal
posture, as evidenced by two Terms of continued gradual lessening of
conservative voting power across a broad range of cases, 12 or (b) a
Court that remains basically conservative, with liberal outcomes in
2002 and 2003 suggesting (at most) a slight recalibration in the scales
of justice. 3 Either description seems defensible on the basis of the
data.
Whatever characterization ultimately proves accurate, the Study
again demonstrates a rather unsteady balance between liberal and
conservative ideologies on the United States Supreme Court. Con-
7. Civil/State, Civil/Federal, First Amendment, Equal Protection, Statutory Civil
Rights, Federal Jurisdiction, and Federalism cases. See infra Data Tables 1, 2, 5-9.
8. Last Term, liberal movement in Majority outcomes was noted on the Tables tabulat-
ing outcomes in Civil/State, Criminal/Federal, Equal Protection, Statutory Civil Rights, Fed-
eralism, and Swing-Vote cases. See 2002 Study, supra note 1, at Data Tables 1-10. Three of
these Tables - Civil/State, Equal Protection and Statutory Civil Rights - demonstrate lib-
eral momentum in 2003.
9. Tables 1, 3 and 4, tabulating results in Civil State, Criminal/State, and Criminal/ Fed-
eral cases, are ranked among the 2003 Study's most reliable indicators of ideological bias
(Section V, below). Those Tables also demonstrate notable conservative movement in the
outcome of Split Cases.
10. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 505.
11. A seesaw pattern is evident in the past four Terms. The 1999 Study suggested con-
servative movement (1999 Study, supra note 1, at 544), the 2000 Term evidenced liberal re-
sults (2000 Study, supra note 1, at 248), the 2001 Term showed conservative momentum
(2001 Study, supra note 1, at 308), with the 2002 Term again moving in a slight overall liberal
direction. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 498.
12. The 2002 Study demonstrated overall liberal movement in six of the ten Tables.
2002 Study, supra note 1, at 505.
13. Liberal movement on six or seven Tables in 2002 and 2003 may not be significant,
particularly when considered against the generally conservative outcomes of the majority of
cases tabulated during those Terms.
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servative voting patterns, moreover, appear to be in decline. Accord-
ingly, the ideological views of future Justices will almost certainly re-
balance (perhaps dramatically) what has been for some time a judicial
14seesaw.
II. Mode of Analysis
This Study is based on the tabulation and mathematical analysis
of each Justice's votes in ten categories of cases. Nine of the catego-
ries are based on the nature of the issues addressed (e.g., First
Amendment and Equal Protection) or on the character of the parties
involved (i.e., state or federal government litigants). 5 The tenth cate-
gory tabulates the number of times each Justice voted with the major-
ity in cases decided by a single, or swing, vote.
The first nine categories are designed to detect each Justice's at-
titude toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court deci-
sions: the protection of individual rights and judicial restraint. The
tabulation of votes in these nine categories reveals, in broad strokes,
the frequency with which individual Justices and the Court as a whole
vote to protect individual rights 6 or to exercise judicial restraint. 7
14. It hardly takes advanced statistical analysis to demonstrate that ideology has taken
center stage in current discussions (and official actions) related to the federal judiciary. It
increasingly appears that judicial nominees are selected by the President and opposed by the
Senate on ideological grounds - resulting in an on-going political and constitutional dispute
regarding the nomination, confirmation and subsequent role of federal judges. See, e.g., Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust.- How Courts Can Support Democracy by Low-
ering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L. J. 1279, 1285 (2005) (speaking of the Judicial activ-
ism on the Burger and Rehnquist courts as a response to gay rights, women's rights, and
traditional values countermovements); Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitu-
tional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 847, 858 (2005) (speaking of the amount of criticism to the
Supreme Court's recent activism); Fight over judges; Agreement likely won't end long-
running war, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., May 25, 2005, at Opinions section; Rushing to
Judgement [sic], BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 2005, at A22.
15. The categories are as follows: (1) civil controversies in which a state or one of its of-
ficials or political subdivisions is opposed by a private party; (2) civil controversies in which
the federal government or one of its agencies or officials is opposed by a private party; (3)
state criminal cases; (4) federal criminal cases; (5) First Amendment issues of freedom of
speech, press, religion, and association; (6) Equal Protection claims; (7) statutory civil rights
claims; (8) issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing, justiciability, and related mat-
ters; and (9) federalism cases.
16. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the outcome of
state and federal criminal prosecutions (Tables 3 and 4), as well as those detailing the resolu-
tion of claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), the Equal Protection Clause (Table
6), and civil rights statutes (Table 7). The civil cases examined in Data Tables 1 and 2 also
involve individual rights, as these suits pit the government against persons asserting private
rights. The federalism decisions tabulated in Table 9 are less obviously relevant to individ-
ual rights because such decisions focus on the balance of federal and state authority. Never-
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From the voting patterns that emerge, the Study determines
whether individual Justices and the Court are taking conservative or
liberal positions. The Study classifies outcomes that favor an asser-
tion of government power as "conservative" and outcomes that favor
a claim of individual rights as "liberal." Accordingly, the Study classi-
fies as conservative a vote for the government against an individual, a
vote against a claim of constitutional or statutory rights, a vote against
the exercise of federal jurisdiction, or a vote favoring state (as op-
posed to federal) authority on federalism questions. The Study classi-
fies all other votes as liberal.
This analytical scheme is not perfect. Unanimous decisions,
which constitute a significant portion of all cases decided by the
Court, are included in the Study's calculations even though liberal or
conservative ideology may not have influenced the outcome of such
cases.1 8 Unanimous opinions often result when either the law or the
facts, or both, point so clearly in one direction that ideology is not a
decisional factor. 9 Furthermore, concern for individual rights is not
always, or even necessarily, the attitudinal opposite of judicial re-
straint.20
theless, in such cases, the practical effect of voting for the state is to deny federal relief to a
party alleging state encroachment upon his or her rights, and thus is counted as a conserva-
tive vote.
17. Jurisdictional questions (Table 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the Jus-
tices to avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of judicial
restraint. Other tables included in the Study, however, also provide some indication of the
individual Justices' (and the Court's) positions on the "judicial restraint/judicial activism"
axis. Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to the policy-making branches
of government, adherence to precedent, avoidance of constitutional bases of decision when
narrower grounds exist, respect for the Framers' intent when construing constitutional text,
and avoidance of issues rendered unnecessary by the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, politi-
cal questions, etc. As a result, a vote in favor of individual rights claims (Tables 1-7) may
provide some indication of "judicial activism" because judicial recognition of individual
rights often requires the Court to overturn precedent or invalidate an existing statute. Fed-
eralism issues (Table 9) are also relevant because judicial restraint is traditionally identified
with respect for the role of the states within the federal system.
18. This Term, for example, seven of 11 cases were decided unanimously on Table 4
and three of six cases were decided unanimously on Table 7.
19. An example of what seems to be a fairly non-controversial case for the court was
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004) (case was only 6 pages long and decided per cu-
riam).
20. For example, the Court was rather receptive to statutory civil rights claims this
Term. See Data Table 7. Justice Scalia (generally considered a conservative jurist) voted to
uphold the statutory claim in four of six cases. Justice Scalia's actions in these cases may
involve not only concern for individual rights (classified as a liberal impulse by the Study),
but a conservative value as well: commitment to judicial restraint. Justice Scalia also mani-
fested this behavior in other categories such as his strict construction of the statute in a
Criminal State case: Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386 (2004) (voted liberally against the court
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Despite the difficulties with our classification scheme, the basic
assumption that supports this Study - that the general orientation of
individual Justices and the Court regarding individual rights and judi-
cial restraint is suggestive of conservative or liberal ideology - ap-
pears sound.2' For example, deference to legislatures frequently re-
sults in rejection of an individual's claim, especially one predicated
upon the impropriety of governmental action.' Judicial restraint is
associated with a reluctance to read new rights into the Constitution
or statutes." Refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction leaves the matter
to the state courts with their possible bias in favor of state govern-
mental action and is a clear rebuff to the claimant seeking federal
protection of rights.24 Therefore, to the extent that the Study's basic
ideological assumptions regarding liberal and conservative outcomes
are sound, it is possible to identify trends by tracking the voting pat-
terns reflected in Data Tables 1 through 10 .'
To determine current ideological positions within the Court,
votes of the individual Justices can be compared with those cast by
other Justices this Term, as well as with the outcomes for the 1986-
2002 Terms. Likewise, the current ideological position of the Court
as a whole can be determined by comparing present outcomes of the
majority to emphasize innocence and strict construction of criminal statute). Another ex-
ample was Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S.
677 (2004) (voting liberally for the claim of Jurisdiction with a broad reading of the statute).
21. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also infra Part V.
22. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (holding that the statutory distinction in
8 U.S.C. § 1409, which imposes different requirements for a child's acquisition of U.S. citi-
zenship based on whether the mother or father is the citizen parent, is consistent with Equal
Protection).
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1998) (holding that claim
preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment is a defensive plea that provides no ground
for removal from state to federal court).
25. Of course, the data are only as reliable as our assumptions. The Study's general as-
sumption that votes favoring individual rights or the federal government (in federalism
cases) reflect liberal views is almost certainly not accurate in every case. For example, see
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), where the more "conservative"
members of the Court voted in favor of a First Amendment claim rejected by the most "lib-
eral" jurists. There, the state's canon of judicial conduct prohibited candidates for judicial
election from expressing their views on certain First Amendment topics, such as abortion.
The "conservative" Justices apparently valued free speech more than continued expansion
of the abortion right. Similarly, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), the more
conservative members of the Court voted liberally against the state in order to reaffirm the
importance of economic rights, generally considered to be a conservative value. Thus, while
voting in favor of a First Amendment Claim and for the federal government on federalism
issues are liberal results under the definitional scheme of this Study, not everyone would
agree that these votes suggest "liberal" motivations.
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Court majority with those of prior Terms. In Data Tables 1-10, this
information appears in the form of voting percentages for each Jus-
tice and for the Court majority. Charts 1-10, in turn, graphically de-
pict the voting trends revealed over the years in the outcomes of Ma-
jority, Split and Unanimous cases on each Table.
Mean Tables 1-10 and Regression Tables 1-10 analyze the voting
patterns of the individual Justices. The purpose of these tables is to
determine whether a Justice's 2003 Term voting record departs in a
statistically significant manner from his or her prior voting pattern
and whether any significant correlation exists among the Term-to-
Term voting patterns of the Justices.26
The Study also calculates an anticipated 2004 Term voting score
for each Justice on each Table. This statistic is calculated with an
Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting
model.27 The ARIMA model is useful in situations where, as in this
Study, a single variable (a Justice's voting score) is forecast
based only on its present and prior values with no other explanatory
variables.
In order to determine which categories best reveal the conserva-
tive and liberal leanings of the Court, we apply factor analysis. This
analysis tests the extent to which the Justices' disposition of the cases
on each of the first nine Tables may have been influenced by lib-
eral/conservative bias. Factor analysis has been used in various em-
pirical studies of human behavior, including psychological inquiries
into such personal traits as personality and intelligence.28  The
results of the factor analysis for the 2003 Term appear in Part V of
this article.
Finally, Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Charts 1-4
compare the Justices' conservative and liberal predilections this Term
and over the course of the entire Study. Frontier analysis mitigates
some of the analytical difficulties previously discussed by measuring
the strength of each Justice's tendencies relative to the rest of the
Court with respect to the cases actually decided in a given Term
rather than against an absolute scale.29
All of the data and statistics reported in this Study must be inter-
preted with caution. The percentages and statistical results revealed
in each table are affected not only by the dispositions of the individual
26. See infra Appendix B.
27. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed explanation of ARIMA.
28. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed analysis of factor analysis.
29. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed analysis of frontier analysis.
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Justices but also by the nature of the cases decided each Term: Fur-
thermore, Supreme Court cases are not the result of random selection
and the universe of votes cast by the Justices is relatively small. Since
both random sampling and large sample size are crucial elements of
any fully reliable statistical analysis, conclusions drawn from this Study
are hardly beyond dispute. There are obvious limitations to any em-
pirical analysis of a subjective decision-making process."
In light of these caveats, one might ask whether this Study is
worth conducting or reading. We believe it is. For years, experienced
Supreme Court practitioners have attempted to divine the ideological
leanings of individual Justices in framing their arguments to the
Court. Moreover, both the media and academicians are fond of at-
taching ideological labels to the Court and its personnel. Supreme
Court practitioners, legal scholars and the public have long assumed
that assessments of Court ideology are valuable, even though such as-
sessments may be based upon little more than the gut reactions of the
attorneys, scholars and news reporters involved. This Study, based
upon a systematic methodology for objectively gathering, quantifying
and analyzing data over time, should be substantially more reliable
than these ad hoc assessments.
III. Overview of the Ideological Trends of the 2003 Term
Seven of the ten Tables this year manifested liberal movement in
the outcome of Majority Cases.31 The outcome of Majority, Split and
Unanimous Cases on those Tables, considered as a whole, also sug-
gests liberal movement on seven Tables.32 This continues an overall
liberal trend noted last Term. The strength of this trend, however, is
questionable.
In the decision of Split Cases - where outcomes may be more
heavily influenced by ideology - only four of the ten Tables indicate
liberal movement.33 Moreover, the three Tables identified by factor
analysis as the most reliable indicators of conservative/liberal bias
demonstrate conservative movement in the decision of Split Cases.'
30. See supra note 6.
31. See supra note 7 above and accompanying text.
32. See infra Charts 1, 2, 5-9.
33. See infra Data Tables 2, 5, 7, 9.
34. Factor analysis identifies CriminallState, CivilState, and Criminal/Federal cases as
the three most reliable indicators of ideological bias in 2003 (Section V below). The out-
comes in Split Cases on all three Tables moved in a conservative direction this Term. Last
Term, by contrast, three of the Tables showing liberal movement (Civil/State, Crimi-
nal/Federal and Federalism) were ranked among the most reliable indicators of ideological
[Vol. 32:3
This conservative movement may be more notable in light of the fact
that six of the ten Tables (considered independently of movement or
trend) reflect conservative outcomes in more than half of the decided
cases. 5 In light of this continued conservative strength, and particu-
larly the conservative movement in the more reliable categories, any
liberal trend may not be as significant as it first appears.
Data Table 1: Civil Cases - State Government versus a Private Party
The Court extended a liberal trend in the decision of Civil/State
Cases that began last Term. This Term, only three Justices voted
more conservatively than during the prior Term: Justices Kennedy,
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist. What is probably more telling on
Table 1 is that even the most conservative Member of the Court, Jus-
tice Kennedy, only voted for the government 57.1% of the time. Five
Justices voted for the government less than 50% of the time. The
Court Majority also made liberal movement by only voting for the
state government in only 46.7% of the cases. Unanimous Cases were
decided almost 17 points more liberally than in 2002.
The only indication of conservative movement comes from the
Court's disposition of Split Cases - where 50% of such decisions
were decided in favor of state governments. While this figure repre-
sents a 5.6 point conservative increase in the Court's support of state
governments from the 2002 Term, a governmental success rate of
50% is hardly the work of a conservative steamroller. Therefore, we
conclude that the data on Table 1 suggests continuation of the liberal
movement on Table 1 that began last Term.
Data Table 2: Civil Cases - Federal Government versus a Private Party
Table 2 indicates that the Court in 2003 had a substantially dif-
ferent level of support for the federal government than for state gov-
ernments in civil cases. For the last several Terms, Table 2 has been a
very conservative category for the Court.36 This Term, even the most
liberal voting pattern evidenced by a Member of the Court was sur-
prisingly conservative: Justice Ginsburg voted for the government
66.7% of the time.37 Every other Justice voted even more often for the
bias. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 505 (Civil/State), 507 (Criminal/Federal), 509 (Federal-
ism), 564 (Factor Analysis ranking).
35. See infra Data Tables 2-5, 9-10 (tables show a conservative stance on the court as a
whole, in more than 50% of the cases, regardless of movement from the prior term).
36. See infra Data Table 2 (cases decided for the government in at least 75% of the
cases since 2001 Term).
37. See infra Data Table 2.
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federal government, with Justice O'Connor reaching the conservative
"top" at 83.3%.
Despite the seeming conservatism of the outcomes, however,
Table 2 demonstrates liberal movement. There was slight liberal
movement (2.6 points) in the outcome of Majority Cases, with a more
substantial 33.3 point liberal decrease in the Court's support for the
federal government in Split Cases. This liberal movement is not
completely offset by a 13.9 point conservative increase in the Court's
support for the federal government in Unanimous Cases.
All of the data, taken together, suggests that the liberal trend on
Table 2 is hardly breathtaking. Outcomes on Table 2 - as they have
in other Terms analyzed by this Study - remain rather conservative.
Nevertheless, the most notable movement on the Table, including the
movement in Split Decisions (where ideology may play its most sig-
nificant role), is liberal.
Data Table 3: Criminal Cases - State Government versus a Private Party
This Term, factor analysis suggests that Table 3 tabulates the
most reliable evidence of conservative or liberal bias on the Court.
Overall, the movement on Table 3 appears to be conservative. Five
members of the Court (including Justices often considered "liberal")
voted more conservatively in the 2003 Term than in 2002.38 In addi-
tion, another five Justices voted conservatively in 2003 more than
60% of the time.39 Majority and Split decisions also evidence conser-
vative movement - with 4.2 and 12.5 point increases, respectively, in
support of state governments.
Data Table 4: Criminal Cases - Federal Government versus a
Private Party
This Table shows clear conservative movement in almost every
measure relevant to the determination of voting trends. Each indi-
vidual Justice voted more conservatively this Term than in the 2002
Term. Majority, Split and Unanimous decisions all indicate strong
conservative movement in support of the federal government. In-
deed, the Court decided only three cases liberally - and those cases
were decided unanimously (where ideology may play a lesser role in
decisional outcomes). Table 4, therefore, as with Table 3, suggests
conservative momentum in the decision of criminal cases.
38. Justices O'Connor, Breyer, Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens.
39. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy.
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Data Table 5: First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association and
Religion
Some may be surprised to find the Court's traditionally "conser-
vative bloc" leading the liberal movement evidenced on Table Five
this Term. Justice Thomas scored the most liberal voting pattern on
the Court, voting 100% of the time in favor of First Amendment
claims." Six other Justices voted more liberally this Term than last.4'
In addition, all cases - Majority, Split and Unanimous - were de-
cided more liberally in 2003 than during the 2002 Term.
Nevertheless, despite this overall liberal movement, fewer than
50% of Majority Cases were decided in favor of a First Amendment
Claim. Moreover, the Court has not approached the liberal First
Amendment position evident in the 2000 and 2001 Terms.
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Claims
The Court decided only one Equal Protection Case this Term. It
is no surprise, therefore, that factor analysis selects Table 6 as the
poorest indicator of ideological bias in 2003. The sole case was de-
cided unanimously for the Equal Protection Claim.42
40. See Appendix C regarding the McConnell case.
41. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg.
42. Because of doctrinal difficulties encountered in recent Equal Protection decisions,
the Court may not be eager to grant review in such cases for the immediate future. Last
Term's sharply divided opinions in the affirmative action arena resulted in fractured opin-
ions and arguably inconsistent application of prior precedent. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Among other things, differ-
ent voting majorities on the Court (1) reaffirmed "strict scrutiny" as the standard of review
for Equal Protection challenges to affirmative action programs (Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Grut-
ter, 539 U.S. at 326), but (2) applied that standard somewhat less than "strictly." But see also
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 380 (Rehnquist C.J., dissenting) ("Although the Court recites the lan-
guage of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review is unprecedented in its
deference.") The Court may be hesitant to address similarly important Equal Protection
questions until somewhat more coherent ideological voting blocs coalesce. The listing of
opinions and voting coalitions in the Grutter case illustrates this inability to agree:
O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined in part
insofar as it is consistent with the views expressed in Part VII of the opinion of
Thomas, J. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined.
Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which
Thomas, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, in which SCALIA, J., joined as to Parts I-VII. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Kennedy,
J., filed a dissenting opinion.
539 U.S. at 310. The Gratz case also evidences the same inability to agree:
Spring 2005] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims
Data Table 7 demonstrates decided liberal movement this Term.
The Court decided Majority Cases liberally 66.7% of the time; the
most liberal outcome for the past 10 Terms. All of the Justices, fur-
thermore, voted liberally in favor of the claim at least 50% of the
time. In addition, Split and Unanimous Cases were decided consid-
erably more liberally than they have been since the 1998 Term.
Data Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction
Data Table 8 reveals further liberal movement for 2003. Major-
ity and Unanimous Cases demonstrated rather substantial liberal
movement of 10.6 and 30 points, respectively. Split Cases demon-
strated 6.1 points of conservative movement, but this was offset by the
liberal voting patterns scored by the individual Justices.
Only two Justices did not vote more liberally this Term than last:
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor voted the same per-
centages as in 2002 term (and these percentages liberally favored a
claim of federal jurisdiction more than 50% of the time). Justice
Thomas was the only Justice to vote conservatively more than 50% of
the time.
The 2002 study anticipated rather accurately the outcomes on
Table 8. The voting patterns of five Justices were anticipated within
five points.4 ' The votes cast by three of the remaining four Justices
were anticipated within ten points."
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases
The Court continued the liberal movement on Table 9 that began
last Term. The movement was substantial in the outcome of Split
Cases, where only 28.6% of the cases were decided conservatively in
favor of the State - down from 50% in the 2002 Term. The Court
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in
which Breyer, J., joined in part. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Breyer, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opin-
ion, in which Souter, J., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Ginsburg, J., joined as to Part II. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Souter, J., joined, and in which Breyer, J., joined as to Part I.
539 U.S. at 248.
43. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ginsburg, Souter, O'Connor, and Kennedy.
44. Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas.
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voted 6.5 points more liberally in the outcome of Majority Cases.
This liberal movement is offset, however, by a 12.5 point conservative
movement in favor of state governments in the decision of Unani-
mous Cases. Nevertheless, even here, the states prevailed only 50%
of the time; a tally that does not reflect impressive conservative
power. According to factor analysis, Table 9 sets out the fourth most
reliable indication of liberal/conservative bias on the Court this Term.
Data Table 10: Swing-Vote Cases
Justice O'Connor, as in 2002, remained the Justice who voted
most often with the Court Majority in the outcome of close 5-4 cases.
She cast the deciding vote in an impressive 73.7% of these cases. Jus-
tices Thomas and Kennedy tied for second place, voting with the ma-
jority 63.2% of the time. Justice Breyer voted the fewest times with
the majority at 44.4%. There was slight conservative movement in
the outcome of Majority Swing-Vote Cases this Term (1.6 points)
from the 2002 Term. This continues a conservative trend that begun
with the 1999 Term following two years of liberal voting in Swing-
Vote Cases
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IV. Analysis
Table 1: Civil-State Party46
For the second year in a row, Data Table 1 is the second most re-
liable indicator of conservative/liberal bias on the Court. The Table,
again like last Term, suggests a liberal trend, with outcomes in Major-
ity and Unanimous Cases moving in a liberal direction f This is bal-
anced against the outcome of Split Cases, which demonstrates 5.6
points of conservative movement. Nevertheless, only 50% of Split
Cases were decided in favor of state governments, suggesting that this
conservative movement does not seriously undermine the liberal
movements noted in Majority and Unanimous Cases.
The liberal trend suggested by Table 1 is reinforced by the voting
patterns of individual Justices. Only three Justices (Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Scalia) voted more conserva-
tively in 2003 than last Term. The remaining six Members of the
Court - including Justice Thomas, who reaches his lowest conserva-
tive voting score for all but the 1999 Term - vote more liberally in
45. Throughout section IV, we begin discussing each table with a footnote that cites
each case, pertaining to that table, for the 2003 Term. The " * " symbol following a case in-
dicates that the case also appeared on another table (Tables 1-9) for analysis, not including
Table 10: Swing-Vote Cases (all cases in Data Table 10 save for Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541
U.S. 465 (2004) are on another Table). The " V " symbol indicates that the case represent
more than one voting pattern for the current table. This means that the case represented at
least two issues, for the given table, and the Justices voted in different groupings on those
issues. Note that some cases may be decided both liberally and conservatively in the same
category, or in different categories. Where a case is decided conservatively/liberally multi-
ple times (meaning on more than one issue with distinct voting pattern) a number will follow
the case citation with and "x"- e.g. "2x." Furthermore, there were six cases this term that we
could not graph. See Appendix A: The Universe of Cases. This means that these cases were
not on any of the Data Tables 1-10. The cases that were not able to be placed on Data Ta-
bles 1-10 this Term are: Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56 (2004); Olympic Airways v.
Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004); Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004); $. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.
v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004); Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz,
541 U.S. 739 (2004); F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
46. Cases decided in favor of the state: Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)*; Nixon v.
Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 124 (2004)*; Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004)*; City of
Littleton v. Z. J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004)*; Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004)*Y (2x)(On second issue only Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist and
Thomas voted, so it is not controlling); Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004)*7.
Cases decided against the state: Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004); Muhammad v. Close,
540 U.S. 749 (2004)*; Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality (2004)*; Tennessee Student
Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004)*; Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)*;
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004)*Y (2x); Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004)*Y.
47. The outcome in Majority Cases moved only 5.3 points. However, the liberal move-
ment in Unanimous Cases was a more substantial 16.3 points.
2003 than during the 2002 Term."
One of the most intriguing facts revealed by Table 1 this Term is
a 10-point drop in support for state governments between the last of
the four Justices at the conservative top of Table 1 and the "most
conservative" of the five Justices holding the liberal bottom: Justice
Thomas' 53.3% score on Table 1 is followed by the 42.9% score of
Justice Souter. 49 Justice Stevens, as anticipated by the 2002 Study, ful-
filled expectations by casting only 28.6% of his votes for state gov-
ernments; the most liberal voting pattern on Table 1.50
Justice Kennedy led the conservative effort this Term, making a
huge jump from the most liberal position on Table 1 last year to the
most conservative position in 2003. Despite this jump, his voting has
been so erratic over the past ten years that this shift does not repre-
sent a statistically significant change in voting behavior over time.
Furthermore, despite Justice Kennedy's volatile voting record, the
2002 Study anticipated his voting behavior this Term rather accu-
rately: Justice Kennedy voted only 7.1 points more conservatively
than anticipated by the 2002 Study. His voting behavior in 2004 is ex-
pected to be more liberal than in 2003.
Another interesting trend in 2003 is a return to "normalcy" on
Table 1. In 2002, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Kennedy voted liberally more than 50% of the time - a rather unex-
pected phenomenon.5' But that was not the only unusual pattern in
2002; the traditionally liberal Justices were uncharacteristically con-
servative. These outcomes suggest that Civil/State Cases on the 2002
docket encouraged "pole switching," where generally conservative
52Justices voted liberally and vice versa. Table 1 in 2003 indicates a
more standard pattern for both camps, with conservatives generally
voting more conservatively and liberals voting more liberally.
5 3
The voting patterns anticipated in 2002 for Table 1 this Term
48. See infra Data Table 1.
49. Such a gap has not been matched since the 1996 Study, where Table 1 revealed a
gap of 14.2 points between five conservative Justices and the first of four liberal Justices.
50. See infra Data Table 1. While Justice Stevens' 28.6% score is somewhat more lib-
eral than the 40.4% score anticipated by the 2002 Study, his actual behavior deviated from
anticipated behavior by less than 12 points and - as anticipated in 2002 - he holds the
most liberal position on Table 1.
51. Id.
52. See 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 510-11 (speaking of the "liberal jurists," Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens, had positioned themselves at the conservative end of the rank order).
See also id. at 525 (Mean Table 1 shows that those "liberal jurists" had voted in a statistically
significant fashion last Term).
53. See Data Table 1.
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were within 20 points of the actual voting behaviors of every Member
of the Court. Four Justices' voting patterns were within 10% of their
anticipated scores (Justices Souter, Scalia, Kennedy, and O'Connor).
Justice Souter's 2003 voting record was the closest to anticipated, with
only a 1.2 point difference in his actual voting percentage. The only
notable vote correlation in Civil/State Cases involves Justices Gins-
burg and Stevens, suggesting that their voting behavior tends to move
similarly over time. 4
Data Table 2: Civil Cases - Federal Government versus a Private Party"5
Table 2, taken as a whole, seems to demonstrate liberal move-
ment this Term. The strength of this liberal trend, however, is ques-
tionable.
Table 2 evidences significant liberal movement in the decision of
Split Cases (33.3 points - down from a 100% vote in favor of the fed-
eral government last Term). There is also slight liberal movement
(2.6 points) in the outcome of Majority Cases. Balanced against these
indicators of a liberal trend is a 13.9 conservative movement in
Unanimous Cases. With conflicting indications, this Study assumes
that movement in the outcome of Split Cases is more significant than
movement in Unanimous Cases (based on the assumption that ideol-
ogy plays a more significant role in the resolution of questions de-
cided by a divided vote). Therefore, on balance, Table 2 appears to
demonstrate liberal movement.
This liberal movement, however, is at best minimal and perhaps
non-indicative. Table 2 has consistently reflected conservative out-
comes over time. This Term, the most liberal Justice - Justice Gins-
burg - voted for the federal government 66.7% of the time. The
most conservative jurist, Justice O'Connor, cast 83.3% of her votes
54. Regression Table 1 reveals an R2 statistic of .9 for Justices Ginsburg and Stevens.
55. Cases decided for the federal government: Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (2003);
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)*Y(5x); SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S.
389 (2004); Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004); Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004);
U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus., 540 U.S. 736 (2004); United States v. Galletti, 541 U.S.
114 (2004); Nat'l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004); Household
Credit Servs. Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232 (2004); Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S.
752 (2004); Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004); Cheney v. U.S. Dist.
Court for D.C., 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004)*; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004)*Y; Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). Cases decided against the federal government:
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)*Y; Bedroc Ltd. v. United States,
541 U.S. 176 (2004); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004)*; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124
S. Ct. 2633 (2004)*¥; Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004)*.
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for the government. 6 Furthermore, there are only ten instances be-
ginning with the 1995 Term where a Justice has voted less than 50%
of the time for the federal government on Table 2." With such consis-
tent conservative voting patterns over time, and with overall out-
comes on Table 2 this Term remaining conservative, the liberal trend
evidenced by the Table may be a temporary anomaly. Supreme
Court practitioners may also wish to note that this statistical history
suggests that the federal government is highly favored in the outcome
of Civil/Federal Cases.
Thus, trend data from Table 2 must be considered with caution.
Although Table 2 tabulates outcomes from a relatively large sample
(at least as "large sample" is understood under the constraints of this
Study),58 factor analysis demonstrates that Data Table 2 provides the
second least reliable evidence of ideological bias this Term. 9 This
lack of reliability may flow from the fact that Table 2 demonstrates
"liberal" movement on a Table that - considered over time - has
demonstrated relatively conservative voting patterns.
Table 2 this Term also reflects a large number of statistically sig-
nificant changes in the voting patterns of individual Justices. Of all
the Justices, only Justice Ginsburg's 2003 voting pattern lacked statis-
tical significance when compared with her mean voting percentage
over time. The voting patterns of the remaining members of the
Court were statistically significant, with two voting more liberally
than in 2002 (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy) and six
moving in a conservative direction (Justices O'Connor, Thomas,
Breyer, Scalia, Souter, and Stevens).
56. This was a leap from the second most liberal position last Term at 54.6%. Justice
O'Connor's jump represented the largest movement on the Court on Table 2 - with the
result that her score was 28 points more conservative than anticipated. Traditionally, Justice
O'Connor is one of the more liberal Justices on Table 2, and the Study anticipates she will
return to a more liberal position next Term. See infra Data Table 2
57. Surprisingly, seven of those instances involved traditionally conservative Justices:
Justice Thomas four times, in 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2001, Justice Kennedy twice, in 1997 and
2000, and Justice Scalia once, in 1996. See infra Data Table 2.
58. Table 2 tabulates the outcome of 24 decisive votes by the Court in 2003. Only Ta-
ble 3, which tabulates the results of 27 decisive votes, has a larger sample size. Table 2 tabu-
lates a relatively large voting sample, in part, because of the numerous opinions, issues and
outcomes of the McConnell case, which dealt with the McCain-Feingold campaign finance
legislation. See Appendix C for a detailed explanation of how we understood the McConnell
case.
59. See Section V below.
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Data Table 3: Criminal Cases - State Government versus a Private
Party6°
Factor analysis for 2003 selects Table 3, Criminal/State Cases, as
the most reliable indicator of conservative/liberal bias on the Court.6t
Table 3 indicates a continuing and significant conservative trend on a
Court plainly divided in two ideological blocs.
Various data on Table 3 demonstrate a conservative trend in the
disposition of State/Criminal Cases. Only two individual voting pat-
terns (those of Justices Stevens and Breyer) moved in a statistically
significant manner - and that movement was conservative.6 ' The
outcome of Split and Majority Cases, furthermore, continue a conser-
vative trend that began two years ago.
In 2001, Majority Cases were decided for the government 50% of
the time - this Term, the success rate for state governments rose to
63%. Similarly, in the 2001 Term, Split Cases were decided in favor
of the states 40% of the time - this Term, the outcome of 62.5% of
the Split Cases favored state governments. The outcome of Unani-
mous Cases moved 16.4 points in a liberal direction this Term - but
the Court still favored state governments in 63.6% of these cases (a
rather strong conservative outcome when measured against results
from prior Terms). Table 3, therefore, suggests substantial conserva-
tive momentum in the decision of State/Criminal Cases.
This conservative trend has been dominated by bloc voting, with
five conservative Justices and four liberal Justices on Table 3.63 His-
torically, there has been a significant "point gap" between these two
blocs. The gap this Term, while greater than it has been in the recent
past,64 it is less extreme than in some prior Studies.65
60. Cases decided for the state government: Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003)*;
Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003)*; Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003); Illinois v.
Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) V (2x); Illiniois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544 (2004)*; Baldwin v.
Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004); Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004); Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386
(2004); Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652
(2004); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004); Pliler v. Ford, 542
U.S. 225 (2004); Beard v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504 (2004); Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct.
2519 (2004); Holland v. Jackson, 124 S. Ct. 2736 (2004). Cases decided against the state gov-
ernment: Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) Y(3x); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004)
Y(2x); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637
(2004)*; Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562
(2004); Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
61. See Section V.
62. See infra Mean Table 3.
63. See infra Data Table 3.
64. The gap this Term was 20 points, in 2000 it was 16.7, in 2001 it was 15.4. See infra
Data Table 3.
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In 2003, Justice Thomas (voting for state governments 80.0% of
the time) leads the conservative alliance, the ninth time he has held
the top position on Table 3 over the last ten years. 66 Justice Stevens
holds the most liberal position on the Table, a slot he has held for
eight of the last ten years.67 Next Term, the Study anticipates that Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas will be in close competition for most conser-
vative Justice, while Justices Ginsburg and Stevens will vie for most
liberal position.68
Since the 1994 Term the "conservative" bloc of five Justices has
been separated from the "liberal" bloc of Justices by an average of
17.7 points.69 This Term, the gap between the conservative and liberal
blocs is 20 points - the distance between Justice Kennedy's 64.0%
vote tally (at the bottom of the conservative bloc) and Justice
Breyer's 44.0% total (at the top of the liberal bloc). 7' Last Term, the
gap between voting blocs was 27 points.71 The high-water mark was
the 1999 Term, when 37.4 points divided the blocs on the Court.
Over the years, the Justices have narrowed the 1999 gap between
voting blocs,72 and the 2003 Term is no exception. Table 3 suggests
that both the conservative and liberal blocs are making incremental
moderating movement toward each other. This Term, four Justices at
the conservative top of Table 3 moved liberally from last year's per-
centages: Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and
65. In 1999 the difference between the blocs was 37.4, and in 2002 it was 27.2.
66. See infra Data Table 3 (sole exception was 1999 when Rehnquist was the conserva-
tive leader).
67. See infra Data Table 3 (sole exceptions were 2000 [Ginsburg and Breyer led the lib-
eral voting], and 2002 [Ginsburg led the liberal voting]).
68. See infra Data Table 3. Perhaps because Justice Stevens has made a statistically sig-
nificant conservative movement over the last two terms, the Study anticipates that he will be
slightly more conservative than Ginsburg. Id.; see also Mean Table 3.
69. See infra Data Table 3. This was computed by comparing the fifth most conserva-
tive Justice with the sixth most conservative Justice in each year since 1994. This calculation
does not take into account when Justice O'Connor swung liberally in the 2001 Term to cre-
ate a 30-point gap between "conservative" and "liberal" blocs for that Term.
70. See infra Data Table 3.
71. See infra Data Table 3.
72. See infra Data Table 3. Although the 2000 Term had only a 16.7 point gap between
voting blocs, in 2001 Justice O'Connor swung liberally and the court was divided by 30 per-
centage points. Id. On a graph since 1999 therefore of the split between the two blocs the
2000 Term would appear as a severe anomaly amidst a otherwise smooth line downwards.
The 2000 Term cannot wholly be discounted, as it is more representative of the pre-1999
Term split differential. However, we point out that it is something of an anomaly along an
otherwise smoothly downward sloping line from the 1999 Term. The unambiguous "trend"
illustrated by Data Table 3 is that the court is slowly calming down from its 1999 polariza-
tion.
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Kennedy. The remaining five Members of the Court (Justices
O'Connor, Breyer, Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens) all voted more
conservatively than last Term.73 As a result, although the 2002 Study
anticipated that the 2003 "point gap" would be 26.7 points,74 the
Court narrowed that distance by about seven points. The Study an-
ticipates continued bloc voting on Table 3 for the 2004 Term.75
One other point on Table 3 is worthy of note: the significant role
played by Justice O'Connor in the outcome of Criminal/State Cases.
There is a close relationship between Justice O'Connor's voting pat-
terns on Table 3 and the outcome of Majority Cases.76 In the seven
Terms between 1994-2000, Justice O'Connor's voting pattern pre-
cisely matched the outcome in Majority Cases five times. 77 In two of
the last three Terms, furthermore, her voting pattern was closer to the
outcome of Majority Cases than any other Member of the Court.8
Based on these percentages alone, it appears that as goes Justice
O'Connor, so goes the Court in the disposition of State/Criminal
Cases.
79
Data Table 4: Criminal Cases - Federal Government versus a Private
Party8°
Table 4, Federal Criminal Cases, provides the third most reliable
evidence of conservative/liberal bias this Term." This Table demon-
strates marked conservative movement by the Court - in an area
that, until the 2002 Term, had not evidenced the classic conserva-
tive/liberal voting blocs.
73. See infra Data Table 3. See also note 72 above.
74. See infra Data Table 3 (anticipated scores); 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 531 (Data
Table 3 showing predictions for this Term).
75. See infra Data Table 3.
76. See infra Data Table 3.
77. See infra Data Table 3 (1994, 1996-98, 2000).
78. See infra Data Table 3 (2001, 2002).
79. To make a more definite assertion we would need to actually review all the individ-
ual cases and see that Justice O'Connor's vote actually was part of the majority vote. How-
ever, even that review would not change the fact that since 1994 her voting percentage has
been such an amazing indicator of the majority vote.
80. Cases decided in favor of the federal government: United States v. Banks, 540 U.S.
31 (2003); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004); United States v. Lara, 541
U.S 193 (2004)*; Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004); Thornton v. U.S., 541 U.S. 615
(2004); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004); United States v. Patane,
124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004)V; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004)*. Cases decided against
the federal government: Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003)*; Fellers v. United
States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004); United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004)Y.
81. See Section V.
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The outcome of Majority, Split, and Unanimous Cases all evi-
dence conservative movement. Every Split Case this Term was de-
cided in favor of the federal government. Outcomes in Majority and
Unanimous Cases evidenced significant conservative movement as
well, moving from 33.3% (in 2002) to 77.8% of Majority Cases de-
cided in favor of the government in 2003, with a similar increase from
33.3% (in 2002) to 66.7% of Unanimous Cases. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas led the conservative movement, with
80% of their votes cast in favor of the government. 2 Justice Souter
was the most liberal Justice, placing only 36.4% of his votes with the
federal government.83 Next Term, the Study anticipates that the
Court will remain conservative, with six Justices voting for the gov-
ernment at least 50% of the time.84
Unlike Table 3, Table 4 does not have an extensive history of
readily identifiable "blocs" of Justices separated by significant "gaps"
in voting percentages. During the 1995-1997 Terms, all of the Justices
voted for the federal government in criminal cases at least 50% of the
time. In 1998 the Court began to divide somewhat more sharply, but
the voting blocs evident on Table 3 did not emerge until the 2002
Term.85 Instead of evidencing fixed ideological blocs separated by a
substantial voting gap, the votes on Table 4 have reflected rather
volatile voting behavior by the individual Justices and the Court as a
whole.m
Bloc voting in 2003 is evidenced by the 15.4 point gap between
the "bottom" of the conservative bloc, Justice Scalia (70%), and the
"top" of the liberal bloc, Justice Ginsburg (54.6%). But, even with
this bloc voting, seven of the nine Justices voted conservatively at
least 50% of the time. Justices Stevens and Souter are the only Jus-
tices who voted for the government less than 50% of the time. In ad-
dition, each Justice increased their individual voting percentage in fa-
vor of the government this Term.
82. See infra Data Table 4.
83. See infra Data Table 4.
84. The voting patterns of the individual Justices in 2003 were anticipated quite accu-
rately in the 2002 Study. The anticipated voting patterns of five Justices were within 10
points of their actual outcomes: Justice Thomas (.4), Justice Kennedy (2.5), Justice Souter
(4.5), Chief Justice Rehnquist (6.4), and Justice Scalia (9.1). See supra/infra Data Table 4,
and 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 535 (actual table where prediction was made).
85. In the 2002 Term, the voting alignment on Table 4 was similar to that of Table 3,
with the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy, and O'Connor holding the five
"most conservative" positions on the Table. However, the point gap between this conserva-
tive bloc and the liberal bloc was not startling: just 6.7 points in 2002. See infra Data Table 4.
86. See infra Chart 4 (see lines since 1999).
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Justice Souter was the only Justice to manifest a statistically sig-
nificant change in voting behavior on Table 4. This "significant"
change was produced by a seemingly small 3.1-point movement from
last Term. By contrast, Justice Steven's 45.5-point movement in 2003
is statistically "insignificant." What explains these seemingly incon-
gruous results? The fact that statistical significance is determined by
measuring a Justice's voting behavior against the Justice's average
mean over time.
Significance is not measured simply by comparing one Term's
voting behavior with the next. Justice Stevens' behavior on Table 4
has been highly volatile - last Term he did not vote for the govern-
ment a single time.87 As a result, a 45.5-point movement does not de-
part significantly from Justice Stevens' mean voting behavior over
time. Justice Souter's 3.1-point movement does.88
Table 4, finally, reveals several relationships between the voting
behaviors of two pairs of Justices. The voting behavior of Justices
Ginsburg and Souter, and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, are highly
correlated, with R scores of .87 and .79, respectively.
Data Table 5: First Amendment Cases - Rights of Expression,
Association, and Religions
Table 5 demonstrates liberal movement by the Court in the dis-
position of First Amendment issues, possibly suggesting increased re-
ceptivity to such claims (in contrast to the Court's rather conservative
rejection of free speech claims during the prior two Terms). Any
forecast of the future course of First Amendment law, however,
seems problematic.'
The Court favored First Amendment Claims in 42.9% of Major-
ity Cases in 2003 - a seemingly conservative result that nevertheless
represents a considerable liberal jump of 17.9 percentage points from
the previous Term. The Split and Unanimous Cases also evidence
liberal movement. Last Term, no Unanimous Case accepted a First
87. See infra Data Table 4; see also 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 514 (naming this phe-
nomenon a "high water mark" for the Justice).
88. Justice Souter's voting percentage was also statistically significant last year. See
2002 Study, supra note 1, at 537 (Mean Table 4 for 2002 Term).
89. Cases decided in favor of the First Amendment claim: McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)*¥; Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004)*. Cases decided
against the First Amendment claim: McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93
(2003)*¥(3x); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)*; City of Littleton v. Z. J. Gifts D-4,
L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004)*.
90. Voting patterns on Table 5 have been highly volatile over the past ten Terms. See
infra Data Table 5.
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Amendment Claim; the Court's acceptance of 50% of such claims in
2003 demonstrates clear liberal movement.9" The outcome in Split
Cases moved a more modest seven points in favor of the First
Amendment Claim.
The voting patterns on Table 5 have been highly volatile in re-
cent years. As a consequence, the voting behaviors for the Justices
and the Court anticipated in the 2002 Study were not very accurate;
only two anticipated voting patterns for the 2003 Term (involving Jus-
tices Kennedy and Scalia) were within 10 points of actual outcomes.
The Study also anticipated rather more liberal results for the Court as
a whole. Nevertheless, the 2003 Term does evidence liberal move-
ment away from the conservative approach that has dominated since
the 2000 Term." Indeed, Justice Breyer was the only Justice to vote
more conservatively this Term than in 2002.9'
The 2003 Term marks an approach to more traditional voting
patterns on Table 5. In 2002, Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Jus-
tices Kennedy and O'Connor, never voted for a First Amendment
claim. Such behavior had not been exhibited on Table 5 since the
1997 Term.94 This Term, by contrast, all of the Justices voted for the
claim at least once.95
Some may be surprised to find Justice Thomas holding the most
liberal position on Table 5. But, given past trends, this should not be
too surprising: in the ten Terms since 1994, Justice Thomas has held
the first or second most liberal spot on First Amendment issues eight
times. 96 Admittedly, Justice Thomas voted in favor of First Amend-
ment claims in 2003 (100%) well beyond his mean voting percentage
for all prior Terms (51.6%). 97 The Study anticipates that, in 2004, Jus-
tice Thomas will vote more conservatively, closer to his mean voting
91. See infra Data Table 5.
92. See infra Data Table 5. See also 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 515 (discussion of the
trend).
93. Six of the nine Justices evidenced statistically significant changes in their voting be-
havior, including Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer. See infra
Mean Table 5.
94. See infra Data Table 5. See also 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 515 (discussion of
vote).
95. See infra Data Table 5.
96. See infra Data Table 5 (was in second most liberal position in 1994, 1997, 1999,
2002) It should be noted that in 1997 there were only two possible positions. 1997 Study,
supra note 1, at 540 (stating that there was only one case in the 1997 Term). Four of those
years Justice Thomas held the most liberal position of the court. See infra Data Table 5
(1996, 1998, 2001, 2003).
97. See infra Mean Table 5.
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pattern over time.98
The voting behavior of Justices Scalia and Thomas is closely cor-
related on Table 5. They currently share an R 2 statistic of .84. The
correlation between Justices Stevens and Ginsburg percentages is
even stronger, with an R
2 of .89. 9
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Cases'0
Table 6, which this Term collected results from the Court's deci-
sion of a single case, is the most difficult to discuss in a meaningful
way. Not surprisingly, factor analysis ranks Table 6 the lowest of any
Table with regard to reliability on the issue of ideological bias."1 As
noted last Term, the paucity of Equal Protection Cases makes statisti-
cal analysis highly problematic. 2
Nevertheless, and while their significance is decidedly limited,
Table 6 suggests some interesting relationships between the voting
patterns of various Justices 03 The voting percentages of Justices
Souter and Ginsburg on Table 6 are perfectly correlated over time.'O
This does not mean that these Justices cast the same votes; this Study
- which analyzes percentage outcomes in categories of cases, not
outcomes in particular cases - precludes any such assertion.' The
correlation of Justices Souter and Ginsburg's voting patterns does
mean their voting percentages for Equal Protection Cases have been
identical for the period they have both been on the court. In a similar
fashion, Justice Breyer shares an almost perfect correlation (R2 = .97)
with Justices Souter and Ginsburg."' 6 The only conservative pair of
Justices with a comparable correlation is Justice Thomas and Justice
Scalia (R2 = .95)07
98. See infra Mean Table 5; see infra Data Table 5.
99. See infra Regression Table 5.
100. Cases decided in favor of the Equal Protection claim: Jones v. R. R. Donnelley &
Sons, 541 U.S. 369 (2004). Cases decided against the Equal Protection claim: none.
101. See infra Factor Analysis.
102. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 507-08.
103. See infra Regression Table 6.
104. See infra Regression Table 6. See also infra Appendix B, section "D. Correlation."
(describing that correlation in this context does not measure the correlation of how the
judges vote on a case-by-case basis; rather, the correlation spoken of in this article merely
refers to correlation in total voting percentage scores at the end of each Term).
105. Id. As explained in Appendix B, our correlations measure the correlation of final
percentage votes for the government or for the claim.
106. See infra Regression Table 6.
107. As noted in text, the significance of the correlations demonstrated on Table 6 is
questionable. The small number of Equal Protection Cases that renders statistical results
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Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims'"'
Table 7, Statutory Civil Rights Cases, indicates a liberal trend for
the 2003 Term.' 9 In 2002, the Court decided Majority Cases in favor
of the claim only 40% of the time. This year, the claim won 66.7% of
the time. Split and Unanimous Cases were also decided 66.7% of the
time in favor of the claim, up from 50% and 33.3%, respectively, in
the previous Term."' This liberal trend is noteworthy when viewed in
light of the 1999 and 2000 Terms, where the divide between the con-
servative majority and liberal minority was greater and more dis-
tinct."1 Table 7 seems to suggest increased homogeneity in the
Court's disposition of Statutory Civil Rights Cases, as conservative
Justices vote increasingly in favor of the claim.'
After holding the most conservative position on the Court in the
2002 Term, 113 Justice Souter regained (along with Justice Breyer) the
leading liberal position (80%) he held from 1999-2001. Although Jus-
tice Souter has only the fourth most liberal mean over time for statu-
tory civil rights claims prior to 2003,"' his rise to most liberal Justice
on Table 7 this Term may precipitate his rise to most liberal Justice
on the Table over time. This possibility is based on his voting history
in recent years and his statistically significant voting percentage this
Term."' If so, Justice Souter could displace Justices Stevens and
Breyer, who have had the highest voting averages on Table 7 over the
course of this Study.16
A liberal trend is also evidenced by the voting behaviors of the
individual Justices this Term. The 2003 Term voting behaviors for
questionable may well explain why the Table exhibits an unusual cluster of correlated voting
behaviors.
108. Cases decided in favor of the Statutory Rights claim: Muhammad v. Close, 540
U.S. 749 (2004)*; Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)*; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637
(2004)*; Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004)*. Cases decided against the Statu-
tory Rights claim: Raytheon v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003); Gen. Dynamics v. Cline, 540
U.S. 581 (2004).
109. Factor analysis suggests that Table 7 does not provide reliable evidence of ideo-
logical bias on the Court. See infra section V. Factor analysis.
110. See infra Data Table 7.
111. See infra Data Table 7.
112. See infra Data Table 7. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
are on the conservative extreme of Table 7. Nevertheless, they still voted for the claim 50%
of the time.
113. See infra Data Table 7.
114. See infra Mean Table 7. Justice Souter's position, however, is hard to anticipate;
past volatility in his voting behavior has produced a large standard deviation for Table 7.
115. See infra Mean Table 7.
116. See infra Mean Table 7.
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Table 7 anticipated by the 2002 Study were not very accurate. 17 All
of the Justices voted more liberally this Term than in 2002 and much
more liberally than anticipated."' These liberal voting patterns, fur-
thermore, were statistically significant for six Justices: Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, O'Connor, and
Souter."9
In 2003, the Study anticipates some rather unusual results during
the 2004 Term. Next year, the Study anticipates that five Justices will
vote in favor of the claim more than 50% of the time - Justices Souter
(72.7), Breyer (54.8), Stevens (61.7), O'Connor (59.2), and Ginsburg
(66.5). But, in a seemingly inconsistent fashion, the Study also antici-
pates that the Court Majority will favor Statutory Civil Rights Claims
only 41.3% of the time.' On the face of things, these numbers appear
to pose an interesting dilemma because the two results seem to be mu-
tually exclusive: five Justices favoring the claim more than 50% of the
time should result in more than 50% - not 41.3% - of Majority Cases
favoring the claim. This "inconsistency," while theoretically possible,
results from the interaction of multiple (and concededly imprecise) sta-
tistical calculations of anticipated behavior.
As the results of this 2003 Study demonstrate, the anticipated
behavior of an individual Justice deviated at least 10 points from ac-
tual voting patterns about 60% of the time."' Accordingly, if Justice
O'Connor's actual behavior in 2004 deviates in a conservative direc-
tion 10 or 11 points from her anticipated behavior (59.2%), any "in-
consistency" in anticipated 2004 behaviors set out on Table 7 disap-
pears. If only four Justices vote more than 50% of the time in favor
of the claim, as would be the reasonably expected outcome if Justice
O'Connor's actual behavior is 10 or 11 points more conservative than
anticipated, a "liberal" outcome in 41.3% of Majority Cases would be
fairly expected.
It is, of course, impossible to anticipate accurately the voting be-
havior of five Justices of the United States Supreme Court - let
alone the Court as a whole. Nevertheless, the statistical calculations
117. See infra Data Table 7 (only six cases this Term).
118. See infra Data Table 7.
119. See infra Mean Table 7.
120. See infra Mean Table 7.
121. By taking the absolute value of all the errors, then ordering them, it is found that
of the 90 outcomes, 36 of them (40%) are within 10 percentage points of their anticipated.
The median of the absolute values of all the errors is 13.3 (Justice Stevens Data Table 3).
The maximum was 75.8 (Justice Ginsburg Data Table 6), the minimum was .15 (Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist Data Table 8), and the average absolute value of the errors was 19.98.
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of this Study provide a consistent theoretical basis for examining and
discussing ideological voting trends on the Court. "Conservative" or
"liberal" ideology may be devilishly difficult to either track or antici-
pate by means of statistical analysis, but a systematic quantitative ap-
proach (at least over time) should be more reliable than assessments
based upon a less rigorous and thorough foundation. If, as seems to
be the case, judicial appointments will increasingly turn upon assess-
ments of judicial ideology, the trends documented by this Study may
prove to have more than mere academic interest.
Data Table 8: Jurisdiction - Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of
Federal Jurisdiction2
Table 8, Jurisdiction, as with all but three Tables this Term,
demonstrates a liberal trend. The Court increased its liberal support
for extending federal jurisdiction in Majority Cases by 10.6 points. '23
Although the outcome in Split Cases moved toward the conservative
pole of Table 8 by 6.1 points, Unanimous Cases moved toward the
liberal pole by 30 points.124 The 2003 Term's liberal voting cycle was
led by Justice Ginsburg, who cast 81.8% of her votes in favor of ex-
panding federal jurisdiction. The Study anticipates that she will con-
tinue to lead a liberal Court on jurisdictional issues next Term.'25
One of the more interesting potential "ideological gaps" on the
Court lies between Chief Justice Rehnquist (who voted to expand
federal jurisdiction in 54.6% of the cases on Table 8) and Justice
122. Cases decided in favor of the Jurisdictional claim: McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S, 93 (2003)*Y; Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003)*; Kontrick v.
Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004); Illiniois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544 (2004)*; United States v. Lara, 541
U.S 193 (2004)*; Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004)*; Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004)*Y(2x); Aetna Health Inc. v.
Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004)*; Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241
(2004); Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004)*; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124
S. Ct. 2633 (2004)*Y; Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). Cases decided against the Juris-
dictional claim: McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)*Y(2x); Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (only counted
for three votes on table: Justices Souter, Stevens, and Thomas - therefore we did not count
it in majority, split, or unanimous opinions); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004)*; John-
son v. California, 541 U.S. 428 (2004); Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L. P., 541
U.S. 567 (2004)*; Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004)*; Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004)*¥; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004)*.
123. See infra Data Table 8
124. Factor analysis indicates that Table 8 is only the sixth best predictor of conserva-
tive or liberal bias. See infra Section V. As a result, the seemingly significant liberal move-
ment on Table 8 this Term may not be any more noteworthy than last Term's somewhat less
pronounced liberal trend.
125. See infra Data Table 8.
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O'Connor (whose voting behavior was 12.1 points more "liberal," at
66.7 %). 126 This gap suggests that - at least with regard to jurisdic-
tional questions - the sometimes-conservative Justice O'Connor
may now be more closely aligned with a liberal voting bloc.
The foregoing observation, however, may obscure another po-
tentially interesting ideological development: the fact that every
Member of the Court (except for Justice Thomas) favored the expan-
sion of federal jurisdiction in 2003 more than 50% of the time.'27 In-
deed, the history of Table 8 demonstrates the Court's strong ten-
dency, over time, to vote liberally to expand federal court
jurisdiction. 12 8 1994 was the last Term in which jurisdictional claims
prevailed less than 50% of the time. The Court, in short, has been ex-
tending federal court jurisdiction more often than not for nearly the
last decade 129 - a trend that appears to be intensifying with time.'
Perhaps because of the consistent liberal trend noted above, the
anticipated voting behaviors on Table 8 were quite accurate. The ac-
tual voting behavior for every Justice was within 10 points of their an-
ticipated votes, except for Justice Breyer - who only deviated 11.8
points from his anticipated voting pattern. The voting patterns of five
Justices came within five points of anticipated behavior: Chief Justice
Rehnquist (.1), Justice Souter (1.4), Justice Kennedy (2.8), Justice
O'Connor (3.7), and Justice Ginsburg (4.2)."' Next Term the Court's
majority is expected to vote for extending jurisdiction 63% of the
time." '
126. See infra Data Table 8 (same votes as the 2002 Term).
127. See infra Data Table 8. The 2003 Study anticipates that Justice Thomas will con-
tinue as the conservative leader on jurisdictional issues next Term. See supra/infra Data Ta-
ble 8. Justice Scalia is the only other Member of the Court anticipated to vote less than 50%
of the time against extending jurisdiction in 2004.
128. See infra Data Table 8.
129. See note 17 explaining the definition of the Jurisdiction category.
130. In the five Terms covered from 1994-1998, only one Justice voted more than 70%
of the time to extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts: Justice Stevens in 1995. See infra
Data Table 8. Over the last five Terms, this has occurred 13 times. See infra Data Table 8
(1999:6 times, 2001:4 times, 2003:3 times).
131. See infra Data Table 8 (Justice Scalia [7.3], Justice Thomas [8.3], Justice Stevens
[8.4]).
132 See infra Data Table 8.
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Data Table 9: Federalism CasesU3
The Federalism Cases this Term showed clear liberal movement,
which continues the ideological trend of the Court on this Table from
last Term.'34 In Split Cases tabulated on Table 9, the Court ruled in
favor of state governments only 28.6% of the time; a 21.4 point liberal
movement from the 2002 Term.13' The outcome of Majority Cases
also went against the states in 2003; only 36.4% of these cases were
decided in their favor; a more modest 6.5 point liberal trend.3 6 This
liberal movement was slightly diminished by a 12.5 conservative trend
in the outcome of Unanimous Cases. However, the outcome of
Unanimous Cases may be less heavily influenced by ideology at then.137
margin. Therefore, on balance, it appears that Table 9 evidences a
liberal trend.
38
The alignment of the Court on Table 9 this Term returned to the
traditional conservative and liberal alignment challenged by last
Term's ranking of Justice Ginsburg as the fourth most conservative
Justice."' Eight of the last ten Terms have seen Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and O'Connor
holding the top five conservative positions on Table 9."4 The rank
order within this "group of five" has been rather stable: either Justice
Kennedy or Justice O'Connor has held the "least conservative" (or
"most liberal") position within the voting bloc for each of those eight
years, except for the 2001 Term (when Chief Justice Rehnquist held
133. Cases decided in favor of the state: Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003)*;
Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003)*; Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 124 (2004)*;
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004)*. Cases decided against the state (in favor of the fed-
eral claim of relief): Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004); Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conserva-
tion v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004); Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality (2004)*; Ten-
nessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004)*; Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S.
509 (2004)*; Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004)*; Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200
(2004)*.
134. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 520.
135. See infra Data Table 9.
136. See infra Data Table 9.
137. See text accompanying note 19 above.
138. In addition, only two Justices this Term voted more liberally than the previous
Term: Justice Thomas (50%), who was the conservative leader last Term at 64.3%; and Jus-
tice Ginsburg (36.4%), who ranked as the fourth most conservative Justice in 2002 - voting
42.9% of the time in favor of state governments. See infra Data Table 9. The lack of a clear
liberal voting trend by individual Justices, however, may not be significant as none of their
voting patterns on Table 9 this Term demonstrated a statistically significant change in voting
behavior. See infra Mean Table 9.
139. See infra Data Table 9.
140. See infra Data Table 9.
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the post).
141
Over the last ten Terms, the Court has exhibited little volatility
on Table 9. Chart 9, however, graphically demonstrates that - over
the past two Terms - the Court has tended to trend in a liberal direc-
tion with regard to the outcome of Split and Majority Cases. That
trend, as noted above, continues in 2003.
Next Term, the Study anticipates that Justices Scalia and Thomas
will be the conservative leaders, with Justices Breyer and Souter as
the liberal leaders. 142 The Study also anticipates that the outcome of
Majority Cases will continue to trend in a liberal direction. 1
3
Data Table 10: Swing-Vote Cases: Who votes Most Often with the
Majority in Close Cases?'"4
Table 10's tabulation of Swing-Vote Cases - which includes all
cases decided by a single vote (or where the change in a single vote
would alter the outcome, including a 5-3 vote to reverse)' - gener-
ally provides reliable evidence of ideological trends on the Court.
146
This Term, the cases on Table 10 continue a five-Term conservative
streak in the outcome of these important cases.1
4
1
The Justices fell into five discrete ranks on Table 10 in 2003. Jus-
tice O'Connor holds first place on the Table, voting with the Majority
141. See infra Data Table 9.
142. See infra Data Table 9.
143. See infra Data Table 9.
144. Swing-vote cases decided conservatively: McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540
U.S. 93 (2003)*; Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004)*; Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global
Group, L. P., 541 U.S. 567 (2004); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004); Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004)*; Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of
Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004); Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004); Beard v. Banks, 124
S. Ct. 2504 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 711 (2004); United States v. Patane, 124 S.
Ct. 2620 (2004); Holland v. Jackson, 124 S. Ct. 2736 (2004)(we note that this case was treated
as a swing case even though the liberal bloc did not technically vote). Swing-vote cases de-
cided liberally: Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004); Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004); Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (note that this
case was not on any other Data Table 1-9, but it was still a Swing-vote so it is included here,
and not in note 45 for that reason); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)*; Hibbs v. Winn,
542 U.S. 88 (2004)*; Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); Missouri v. Seibert, 124
S. Ct. 2601 (2004); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004).
145. See Appendix A: The Swing-Vote Cases.
146. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 521.
147. See infra Data Table 10. It would not be fair the last five years a conservative
trend when noting the liberal movements between the 1999-2000 Terms and the 2001-2002
Terms. Id. Instead, there is evidence of a conservative streak since the 1999 Term. This
means that the Swing-Votes since 1999 have been decided conservatively more than 50% of
the time.
[Vol. 32:3
73.7% of the time. Justices Kennedy and Thomas tied for second
place, voting with the Majority in 63.3% of Swing-Vote Cases. The
third group, composed of Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Gins-
burg, each voted with the Majority 55.6% of the time. Chief Justice
Rehnquist holds fourth place on Table 10 (47.4%). Justice Breyer
brings up the rear, voting with the Majority in only 44.4% of the
Swing-Vote Cases. Justice Breyer replaces Justice Stevens in 2003 as
the least influential Justice on the Court in closely divided cases.4 '
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter,
and Ginsburg all exhibited a statistically significant change in voting
behavior this Term in swing-vote cases.' 9
Justice O'Connor was not as influential in 2003 as in 2002, hardly
a surprising result (considering her perfect 100% Swing-Vote record
last Term).5 She retains her position as the most influential Justice
in Swing-Vote Cases, even though that influence is some 17 points
less than the Study anticipated last Term.' Justice Scalia was also
substantially less influential this Term than the 2002 Study antici-
pated, voting with the Majority 25 points less often than predicted.152
The 2002 Study, however, anticipated Justice Thomas' voting pattern
on Table 10 rather well; his actual outcome varied only 1.2 points
from his anticipated score.
Conservative coalitions retained decisional control of Swing-
Vote Cases this Term; 57.9% of such cases were decided conserva-
tively. 54 This is the fifth straight year that more than 50% of Swing-
Vote Cases were decided by conservative coalitions.
148. See infra Data Table 10.
149. See infra Mean Table 10.
150. See infra Data Table 10.
151. See infra Data Table 10 (prediction minus actual outcome was -15.8).
152. See infra Data Table 10.
153. See infra Data Table 10.
154. See infra Data Table 10. This continues the Conservative control spoken of last
term. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 521.
155. See infra Data Table 10.
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V. Category Analysis
Beginning in the 1996 Term, we began to analyze the effective-
ness of this Study's categories in measuring liberal and conservative
tendencies and trends. As might be expected, some categories turn
out to be more reliable indicators of ideological tendencies than oth-
ers.
The reliability of the various Tables on this Study can be influ-
enced by many factors, including the particular makeup of the Court's
caseload for a given Term and small sample size. Data Table 6, which
collects the results from cases involving Equal Protection claims, is a
good example. The number of Equal Protection issues decided each
Term tends to be small; this year, only one case is included on Table
6.156 Accordingly, Table 6 is the least reliable indicator of ideological
bias (again) this Term.'57
In order to determine which categories best differentiate be-
tween the voting patterns of more liberal and more conservative Jus-
tices, we have applied a statistical tool known as factor analysis.' By
applying this tool, we have determined that a primary factor may be
extracted from the Study's categories over the entire life of the Study
that accounts for more of the variance revealed by the data on Tables
1 through 9 than any other factor."9 We interpret this "Factor 1" as
liberal/conservative bias for a simple reason: liberal/conservative bias
is what this Study purports to measure. The categories currently load
onto Factor 1 as follows:
156. There we no cases involving Equal Protection claims in the 2001 Term. 2001
Study, supra note 1, at 365. In 2002 there were only four cases. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at
n. 93. This term there was only one case: Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons, 541 U.S. 369
(2004).
157. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 564.
158. For more information regarding factor analysis, see Appendix B.
159. We extract a single factor via principal components analysis and employ a QMAX
rotation to achieve this result.
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According to this ranking, the Table 3, Criminal/State Cases, is
the most reliable indicator of liberal/conservative leanings over time.
Factor analysis also suggests that Table 1, Civil/State Party, Table 4,
Criminal/Federal Party, and Table 9, Federalism, also provide rela-
tively reliable evidence of bias. The reliability of the last five Tables
is more questionable.
This is an interesting outcome, and may seem to contradict what
many Court observers might assume. Categories such as First Amend-
ment Rights, Equal Protection Claims, Jurisdiction, and Statutory Civil
Rights (all of which rank rather low following factor analysis) may seem
to be prime opportunities for the Justices to manifest their individual bi-
ases. However, as discussed in the 2002 Study, these categories may also
provide ample opportunity for "pole-switching," where Justices vote
"conservatively" (under the definitions of this Study) in order to further
a "liberal" policy preference, or vice versa.'O An example of pole-
switching this Term occurred in the Locke v. Davey case, wherein the
more liberal Justices voted against (conservatively) a First Amendment
free exercise claim, while Justices Scalia and Thomas voted for (liberally)
the claim. 6' Another example of pole-switching this Term involved the
various opinions in the McConnell case, where complete voting blocs on
the Court apparently engaged in pole switching.
162
160. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 563 (discussing the Hill and Alameda Books cases and
the pole switching involved).
161. 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (state denial of scholarship to theology student) (note, how-
ever, that free exercise claims are not included in this Study pursuant to our definitional
scheme); see supra note 15; see also Appendix A, subsection 4, Classification by Nature of the
Issue-Data Tables 5 through 9.
162. See Appendix C, Pattern A on First Amendment issues.
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VI. Frontier Analysis
Attempting to quantify the magnitude of a Justice's liberal or
conservative tendencies and to identify trends in such tendencies over
time is challenging for a variety of reasons. One challenge already
discussed is that of choosing appropriate tests and assessing their va-
lidity. Another is dealing with inconsistency in the nature of cases
appealed to the Court from one Term to the next and the Court's se-
lection of which cases it will decide. With varying parameters such as
these, is there any meaningful way to quantify, analyze and compare
the Justices' inclinations? One potentially useful method is frontier
analysis.'63
Frontier analysis focuses on the Justices' relative scores rather
than their absolute scores. Boundaries or "frontiers" are defined by
the highest and lowest scores in each category and each combination
of categories. Each Justice is then evaluated relative to the estab-
lished frontier. By adjusting the relative weights allocated to each
category, the frontier can be adjusted to reflect each category's reli-
ability - as determined by the factor analysis described in Section V.
We present liberal and conservative frontier data for the Court in
Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Analysis Charts 1-4. Two
versions of each frontier are presented.
In Frontier Analysis Tables 1 and 2, we constrain the weights ap-
plied to each category according to the factor analysis hierarchy in
Part V. On these tables, weights are chosen for each Justice that pro-
duce the highest frontier score for him or her, subject to the limitation
that Equal Protection (the least reliable category) cannot receive
more weight than Civil/Federal Party (the next least reliable cate-
gory), Civil/Federal Party cannot receive more weight than Statutory
Civil Rights, and so forth, moving upward from the least reliable
category set out in Part V.
Frontier Analysis Tables 3 and 4 apply no weighting constraints
at all; instead, these tables choose, for each Justice, those weights that
present him or her in the most conservative or liberal light possible.
Each Table lists a "% of Frontier" score for each Justice. Those
with a score of 100% reach the frontier by employing the category
weight distribution shown in the category columns. Scores less than
100% indicate that the most conservative/liberal score the Justice
could obtain with optimal weighting places him or her at the indicated
percentage of the way toward the frontier. In some cases, an optimal
163. For more information regarding frontier analysis, see infra Appendix B.
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combination of weights may place a Justice beyond the frontier. This
condition is known as "superefficiency" and is noted in the charts
when present.
Frontier Analysis Charts 1 and 2 show the constrained scores for
each Justice over the course of this Study in graphical form. Near the
bottom of each chart is an indication of new Justices as they replace
outgoing Justices on the Court. Although former Justices' scores are
not indicated, they contributed to the determination of the liberal and
conservative frontiers during Terms in which they sat on the Court.
Frontier Analysis Charts 3 and 4 show each Justice's range of
constrained frontier scores during the course of this Study. They are
easier to read than the line graphs and give a clearer picture of the
Justice's relative positions and score ranges overall. They do not,
however, show any trend information.
According to the Frontier Analysis Table 1, Chief Justice
Rehnquist regained his position as the most conservative Justice, with
a superefficient score of 113%.164 Justice Thomas (104%) was the
only other Justice to have a superefficient conservative score on the
constrained Table.165 The Table further indicates that Justice Gins-
burg (69%) and Justice Stevens (66%) were the least conservative
Justices this Term.1 66 Justice Stevens shared the position of least con-
servative position last Term with Justice Breyer, 167 who this Term
ranks only as fourth least conservative Justice.
161
Frontier Analysis Table 2 shows that Justice Kennedy is the only
Member of the Court achieving a superefficient, constrained liberal
score. 16 Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist is the least liberal
Justice, a position he has held 12 times since 1987.170 What might be
surprising, however, is that Justice O'Connor is the second least lib-
eral Justice.1 71 The Table shows also that Justice Thomas is the fifth
least liberal, followed by Scalia, who is fourth least liberal.
This outcome creates an interesting comparison between the
rank ordering of Frontier Analysis Tables 1 and 2. Typically a person
164. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 566.
168. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
169. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 2.
170. See infra Frontier Analysis Chart 2.
171. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 2.
172. Id.
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would think that the "most conservative" Justice also would be "the
least liberal" and vice versa - as is the case with Justice Stevens and
Chief Justice Rehnquist - and that the orders of the rest of the
judges would be similarly reversed. However, the Tables in this
Study show otherwise.
Even though Justices Thomas and Scalia are second and third
most conservative on Table 1,173 they do not fill in the seventh and
eighth "least liberal" positions on Frontier Analysis Table 2 - posi-
tions held by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor.'74 At the same time,
however, the more liberal Justices on the Court do retain "mirror im-
age" positions on the constrained Conservative Table 75 and the con-
strained Liberal Table. 76
While the precise reason for the foregoing is certainly open to
debate, it may suggest that Justices Scalia and Thomas are not as
bound to conservative or liberal ideologies as other Members of the
Court. Their voting patterns this Term demonstrated conservative
and liberal patterns, as the constrained Frontier Analysis Tables
demonstrate. This was surprising to the authors, because it seems
natural to think that the voting patterns of Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy - the traditional "swing voters" on the Court - would be
more likely to demonstrate this outcome (i.e., "conservative" Justices
with a "liberal" streak).
77
Frontier Analysis Tables 3 and 4 can be used for multiple pur-
poses. These tables allow people to say what they want to say about
the Justices by focusing on a certain category of cases with disregard
to the rest - or in other words, to make a biased assertion, to give an
uninformed opinion, or to submit an incomplete analysis. For in-
stance, if 100% of the weight for determining a "liberal" justice was
placed on First Amendment cases, then Justice Thomas would be by
far the most liberal Justice on the Court.178 Of course, this does not
173. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
174. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 2.
175. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
176. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 2.
177. There is most likely a more direct way to determine whether or not this assertion
of "mirror rankings" is true. However, we offer it now as merely a point of academic inter-
est. At best we can say this is a hypothesis that may be correct, and we find it interesting to
consider. On the most neutral interpretive level, the reason the blocs are not mirrored is
that the calculations for the liberal frontier will select category weights that optimize the lib-
eral score for a Justice. The conservative calculations do the same for the conservative
score, but may (and almost always do) select a different set of category weights. The rela-
tionships are loosely coupled, but quite complex.
178. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 4.
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mean that Justice Thomas is the most liberal Justice on the Court; but
it does evidence something of the discussion above, that he has liberal
tendencies, as defined by this Study, which may disrupt the ordering
of the Justices on the constrained conservative and liberal Frontier
Tables.1 9 Justice Scalia is the only other traditionally "conservative"
Justice that can claim a superefficient score on the unconstrained lib-
eral table.' 8° This suggests that, as discussed above, Justice Scalia has
liberal tendencies in at least some areas.
Justice Breyer is the only traditionally liberal Justice that made it
to the conservative frontier on the unconstrained analysis. 8 ' Con-
versely, each Justice on the Court was able to make it to the liberal
frontier on the unconstrained analysis."2 This result, however, most
likely results from the fact that there was only a single Equal Protec-
tion case this Term."3 Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, and O'Connor
merely reached the frontier - and did not achieve a superefficient
liberal score - because 100% of the weight was placed on the single
Equal Protection case.18' If there had been a more adequate sampling
of Equal Protection cases, or if we simply excluded Table 6 as a statis-
tical outlier, it is probable that these three Justices would have failed
to reach the liberal frontier.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the constrained
Frontier Tables provide the most reliable evidence of ideological po-
sition. Few experienced observers of the Court (if any) would label
Chief Justice Rehnquist a "liberal." The unconstrained analysis
would allow application of that moniker - even though based solely
on the outcome of one case. Justice Thomas could similarly claim to
be the most liberal Justice, which (while based on the outcome of
votes in First Amendment and Equal Protection cases) would be
questionable as well.
The unconstrained Frontier Tables amplify the effects of pole-switching.
Accordingly, the most reliable evidence of ideology on these Tables comes
from the constrained analysis. Readers should keep in mind that, while the
categories of this Study are not perfect indicators of conservative/liberal bias,
some categories are nevertheless better indicators than others.
179. Justice Thomas, may not have been evidencing a true liberal tendency, but instead
may have been pole switching.
180. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 4.
181. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 3.
182. See infra FrontieT Analysis Table 4.
183. Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons, 541 U.S. 369 (2004). See discussion of Equal
Protection Data Table 6 above.
184. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 4.
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VII. Conclusion
The 2003 data suggests that the United States Supreme Court
may have embarked on a new course. The 2003 Term marks the sec-
ond year of a liberal trend on a majority of the Tables of this Study.
The strength of the trend is subject to reasonable dispute,185 but ap-
pears real nevertheless. The trend, furthermore, suggests a weaken-
ing in the conservative posture of the Court.
Only three Tables indicate sustained conservative movement.
The most substantial conservative movement is demonstrated on Ta-
bles 3 and 4 where the Court has a pronounced tendency to rule in fa-
vor of state and federal governments. Conservative coalitions also re-
tain control of the outcome in close, 5-4 cases. But the power of
conservative coalitions with regard to the outcome of close five-to-
four cases has not notably increased,""s nor have conservative coali-
tions resumed the strength exhibited in 1999-2001 Terms." Mean-
while, traditionally liberal Justices (most notably Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg and Souter) are "moving up" in their ranking on Table 10.188
Seven Tables also suggest liberal movement in the Court's voting pat-
terns. This movement continues a liberal trend that began last year,
as examination of Charts 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 confirms.
Last Term we noted that four years of vacillating voting patterns
(with conservative movement one year followed by liberal movement
the next) on a Court dominated by bloc voting suggested that the
Court's ideological blocs may be "experiencing some difficulty in
'holding their ideology together.""'8 9 The 2002 Study intimated, but
did not directly assert, that it was the Court's conservative (rather
than liberal) forces that were losing ground.' 9° The 2003 data suggest
somewhat more clearly that the Court's conservative bloc is, indeed,
losing coherence. 91 The on-going decline in conservative voting
185. See discussion of Tables 2, 8 and 9, above (some indications of conservative move-
ment though we stated that the table manifests liberal movement overall). Also, the catego-
ries are unequal in their ability to detect conservative or liberal bias. See Section V.
186. In 2002, conservative coalitions controlled the outcome of 56.3% of the Swing-
Vote Cases; this Term, the figure is a mere 1.6 points higher - 57.9%.
187. See supra Data Table 10 (conservative outcome in those Terms was 61.5%, 60.0%,
and 68.0%).
188. In 2003, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter joined the same percentage of ma-
jority Swing-Vote cases as Justice Scalia. Table 10, supra.
189. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 568.
190. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 568. ("The Court's vacillation between conservative
and liberal outcomes suggests that the much-touted conservatism of the Rehnquist Court
may be waning.").
191. There is one area, however, where the Court's "coherence" may be increasing.
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power on the Rehnquist Court may be the most notable finding of the
2003 Study.
Consider the following:
1. As in 2002, the voting patterns of the Justices departed fre-
quently from past practice and many of these departures are liberal:
In 2002, more than half of the Members of the Court, on eight Tables,
departed in a statistically significant fashion from past voting prac-
tices." Significant departures from past voting patterns are not as
prominent this Term, but are still rather marked. The voting patterns
of at least five Members of the Court on six Tables this Term de-
parted significantly from past practice.9 While statistically significant
swings in voting behavior may be due to many factors, the fairly sub-
stantial number of statistically significant voting movements this
Term (as in 2002) may indicate "that the Justices are having some dif-
ficulty holding a steady course as they navigate their way through the
Court's workload."'1 9' This Term, much of this possible "unsteadi-
ness" has resulted in liberal movement.
There were seven tables that manifested a liberal movement.
Discounting completely Table 6 (where all nine Justices' votes were
both statistically significant and liberal - but where the voting sam-
ple consists of a single case) and Table 5 (where the unusual contours
of McConnell may have prompted pole-switching behavior), 95 three
During the 2003 Term, the Court managed to speak more often than not on Tables 1
through 9 with Unanimous Opinions. See Tables 1-9, infra. In last year's study, by contrast,
only Tables 1 and 2 reflected a similar level of solidarity on the Court. 2002 Study, supra
note 1, at 523, 527.
192. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 525, 529, 537, 541, 545, 549, 553, 561 (Mean Tables 1,
2,4-8,10).
193. Table 1 (Civil/State) (6 Justices); Table 2 (Civil/Federal) (8 Justices); Table 5
(First Amendment) (6 Justices); Table 6 (Equal Protection) (9 Justices); Table 7 (Statutory
Civil Rights) (6 Justices); Table 8 (Jurisdiction) (5 Justices). Table 10, Swing-Vote Cases,
also demonstrated statistically significant swings in voting behavior by five Justices. Never-
theless, we exclude Table 10 from the analysis in the text because on this Table statistically
significant changes in a Justice's voting pattern includes that Justice's participation in both
liberal and conservative coalitions. (Table 10 tracks the percentage of the time the Justice is
"with the majority," which may involve either a liberal or conservative coalition.). Statisti-
cally significant departures in a Justice's voting pattern on Table 10, therefore, can not sup-
port an inference that the Justice's voting has moved in either a liberal or conservative direc-
tion.
194. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 567.
195. Pole-switching occurs when a Justice casts a seemingly "liberal" or "conservative"
vote in order to preserve a contrary policy. See supra note 162 and accompanying text dis-
cussing the Locke v. Davey case. Table 5 appears to have been affected by this phenomenon
in 2003. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. See also Appendix C. On Table 5,
[Vol, 32:3
of the remaining four Tables indicate relatively notable statistical de-
partures in a liberal direction. On Table 7, Statutory Civil Rights
Claims, six Members of the Court display statistically significant
changes in their voting behavior - and all of it liberal.'9 The same
this is true for the five Justices exhibiting statistically significant be-
havior on Table 8, Jurisdiction - all significant movements are lib-
eral.197 Table 1 is not as monolithic, but still suggests that departures
from past practice tend toward the liberal. There, four of six Justices'
voting patterns moved significantly in a liberal direction 98 Table 2 is
the only Table where the majority of the statistically significant de-
partures (six of eight) are conservative 99
Thus, a major portion of the "statistically significant" voting
movements of the Justices in 2003 demonstrated a liberal trend.
These patterns suggest that the Court, in 2003, may have experienced
real movement toward liberal outcomes.
2. The data tables reveal consistent ideological bloc voting, but
conservative coalitions continue to lose steam: Last Term, three Ta-
bles demonstrated "expected conservative/liberal voting blocs."' °
There seems to be equally clear evidence of bloc voting in 2003, cou-
pled with continuing indications that conservative coalitions on the
Court (as was noted last Term) are "losing steam." ''
Tables 3 (State/Criminal), 4 (Federal/Criminal), 8 (Jurisdiction),
and 9 (Federalism) demonstrate rather obvious voting blocs. Conser-
vative blocs composed of the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas,
Scalia, Kennedy, and O'Connor - arrayed against the liberal bloc of
three liberal Members of the Court (Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer) show statistically
significant "conservative" movement. The Court's most prominent "swing voter" - Justice
O'Connor - likewise shows statistically significant "conservative" voting. By contrast, two
of the Court's most conservative Members, Justices Thomas and Scalia, chalk up statistically
significant "liberal" vote movements. The meaning of these movements is so muddled by
the unusual contours of the First Amendment issues on Table 5 this Term that inferences
based on this data would be exceptionally problematic.
196. The Chief Justice, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter.
See infra Mean Table 7.
197. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See infra Mean Table 7.
198. Justices O'Connor, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See infra Mean Table 7.
199. Justices O'Connor, Thomas, Breyer, Scalia, Souter, and Stevens. See infra Mean
Table 2.
200. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 567. ("Data Tables 3, 4 and 7 display the expected
conservative/liberal voting blocs on the Court - with generally conservative Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice, holding conservative
positions, and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens holding liberal slots.").
201. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 568.
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Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter - are most obvious
on Tables 3 and 4.
On Table 8, the Court's most conservative Justices (the Chief
Justice and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy) are clustered to-
gether at the conservative end of the Table. But Justice O'Connor,
whose vote provided the crucial fifth vote in nearly 74% of this
Term's Swing-Vote Cases, racks up a voting pattern closer to two
Members of the Court who often join liberal coalitions - Justices
Souter and Breyer - than to any member of the traditional conserva-
tive coalition. On Table 9, the traditional bloc rankings are still ap-
parent, only this time Justices O'Connor and Souter (who hold the
same liberal 45% voting pattern) mark the boundary between the
Court's most conservative Members (the Chief Justice and Justices
Thomas, Scalia and Kennedy) and its most liberal (Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer).
These Tables not only suggest that the Court continues to vote in
identifiable blocs, but that Justice O'Connor is becoming a less reli-
able member of a controlling conservative coalition. This possibility
is further supported by Justice O'Connor's voting pattern on Table 5,
where she ranks squarely in the middle of the traditionally liberal Jus-
tices who (apparently as a result of pole-switching flowing from
McConnell) voted most often against First Amendment Claims this
Term.2'
That conservative coalitions on the Court are "losing steam" is
further supported by Table 10. As in 2002, Table 10 in 2003 does not
rank the Justices within the traditional "conservative/liberal" voting
blocs shown on Table 3, where bloc voting (as well as conservative
dominance) seems absolutely clear. Instead, the "top slot" is held by
Justice O'Connor (joining 73.7% of the majority opinions in closely
divided cases), followed by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, who each
joined 63.2% of such opinions.
Then, in a truly astonishing show of lessened conservative power,
four Members of the Court - Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Scalia - all share "third place" by joining 55.6% of Majority Swing-
Vote Cases. The Chief Justice, who joined 47.4% of these opinions, is
just one step up from the least influential Member of the Court this
Term, the generally-liberal Justice Breyer (at 44.4%). A Court where
Justice Stevens is as likely to join the majority of a five-to-four case as
Justice Scalia, and where the Chief Justice is less likely than either to
be a member of the controlling opinion, is hardly a conservative jug-
202. See Appendix C for analysis of the McConnell case.
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gernaut. Even more than in 2002, it appears that the "the traditional
conservative/liberal blocs are not 'holding together."' 20 3
3. Justice O'Connor is still "the vote to get" in closely decided
cases - and is becoming more a member of the traditionally Liberal
bloc:. Justice O'Connor, as she was last Term, is clearly the decisive
vote in contentious cases. In 2002, she voted with the Court majority
an astonishing 100% of the time in closely divided cases.2" Her
dominance (perhaps not surprisingly) diminishes for the 2003 Term,
but remains at a chart-topping 73.7% - more than 10 points higher
than her nearest rival on the Court, Justice Kennedy. 5 Individually
Justice O'Connor has voted more liberally this Term than she has in
the past.2° Moreover, and perhaps more significant to the future of
this Study, as noted above, this year's Study suggests that Justice
O'Connor's voting pattern may fall closer to a liberal than a conserva-
tive coalition. 7
The 18h Edition of this Study thus reveals a United States Su-
preme Court that remains divided into two uneasy camps. This is
hardly earth-shattering news. What is different in 2003 is that, while
the data from the past several Terms has suggested that neither camp
holds "a position of sustained dominance,"2°  this reality may be
changing. In 2003, the Court continued a second year of sustained
liberal movement and erosion in conservative voting power. This
movement and erosion in conservative power, much more than the
unsteady "drift" noted in 2002, "belies any claim that the Court is a
conservative monolith. '' 209 The Court, as it nears the end of its stew-
ardship under Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, may well be mov-
203. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 568.
204. 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 522.
205 See infra Data Table 10.
206 See infra Data Tables 1-10. Justice O'Connor is voting more liberally now than she
did in 2001 as evidenced on Tables 1, 4, and 6-9. As compared to the to the 2002 Term, it
could be argued that she has made substantial conservative movement on Tables 2-4, and 9.
However, at the same time she made liberal movement on Tables 1, and 5-7, and retained an
equally liberal voting percentage (66.7%) on Table 8. What is clear is that she has not re-
turned to the much more conservative position she held in the 2001 Term, which was a more
conservative term in general for the court. 2001 Study, supra note 1, at 382-383.
207 In Data Tables 1-10 there are only 3 in which Justice O'Connor is not closer to the
traditionally liberal bloc: Data Tables 2-4. An interesting example is her votes in First
Amendment cases where she deeply embeds herself among the traditionally liberal coali-
tion.
208 2002 Study, supra note 1, at 569.
209 Id.
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ing - however cautiously - away from the conservative labels so
consistently attached to it.
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APPENDIX A
1. The Universe of Cases
The only cases included in the database are those cases decided
by full opinion. Decisions on motions have been excluded even if ac-
companied by an opinion. Cases handled by summary disposition are
included only if they are accompanied by a full opinion of the Court
and not if the only opinion is a dissent. Cases decided by a four-four
vote resulting in affirmance without written opinion have been ex-
cluded. Both signed and unsigned per curium opinions are consid-
ered full opinions if they set forth reasons in a more than perfunctory
manner. Cases not fitting within any of these categories are not in-
cluded in the database for any of the tables.
2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly
understood definitions. Generally, the nature of the case is clearly
identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a prob-
lem of classification. No cases in 2001 raised such a question.
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties-Data Tables 1 through 4
Cases are included on Data Tables 1 through 4 only if govern-
mental and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is neces-
sarily true of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these ta-
bles if they do not satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity
might be the United States government or one of its agencies or offi-
cials or, with respect to a state government, one of its political subdi-
visions. A suit against a government official in a personal capacity is
included if that official is represented by government attorneys, or if
the interests of the government are otherwise clearly implicated. In
instances of multiple parties, a civil case is excluded if governmental
entities appear on both sides of the controversy. If both a state and a
federal entity are parties to the same suit on the same side with only
private parties on the other, the case is included on Data Tables 1 and
2. A case is included more than once on the same table if it raises two
or more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case and the is-
sues are resolved by different voting alignments.
4. Classification by Nature of the Issue-Data Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Data Tables 5 through 9
for which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed by written opin-
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ion. One case may thus be included on two or more tables. A case is
also included more than once on the same table if it raises two or
more distinct issues in the category affecting the disposition of the
case and the issues are resolved by different voting alignments. A
case is not included on a table if an issue raised by one of the litigants
is not addressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and Equal Protection issues
poses no special problem since the nature of each claim is expressly
identified in the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press, associa-
tion, and free exercise of religion are included. However, Establish-
ment Clause cases are excluded since one party's claim of religious es-
tablishment is often made against another party's claim of free
exercise or some other individual right, thus blurring the issue of indi-
vidual rights.
Statutory civil rights included on Data Table 7 are limited to
those invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of
1965 and other civil rights statutes expressly barring discrimination on
the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, or physical
handicap. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the
substantive right asserted is based on a federal statute, or if the issue
involves the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the case at hand.
However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions are excluded if the substantive
right asserted is based on the United States Constitution and the issue
relates to that constitutional right. The purpose of this exclusion is to
preserve the distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional
claims.
For Data Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include
not only jurisdiction per se, but also standing, mootness, ripeness, ab-
stention, equitable discretion, and justiciability. Jurisdictional ques-
tions are excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no
member of the Court dissents on the question, even though the Court
may comment on its jurisdiction.
Federalism cases on Data Table 9 are limited to those cases in
which there were issues raised by the conflicting actions of federal
and state or local governments. Common examples of these issues
are preemption, intergovernmental immunities, application of the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments as a limit on federal government
action and federal court interference with state court activities (other
than review of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federal-
ism or interstate relationships, such as those raised by the dormant
Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, are ex-
cluded from the table.
Spring 2005] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
836 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 32:3
5. The Swing Vote Cases
Data Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a
single vote. This category includes five-four decisions and four-three
decisions, if any, as well as five-three and four-two decisions that re-
verse a lower court decision. Affirmances by a vote of five-three or
four-two are not included because a shift of one vote from the major-
ity to the minority position would still result in affirmance by a tie
vote. A case is included more than once in the table if it raises two or
more distinct issues affecting the disposition of the case and the issues
are resolved by different voting alignments.
APPENDIX B
Study Methodology
This Study seeks to quantify three characteristics of Supreme
Court voting behavior: voting trends, mean voting percentages and
relationships among the Justices' voting patterns. The following sec-
tions explain the statistical methods employed in this Study and how
test results should be interpreted.
A. Scores
Each score in this Study is simply the percentage of times a Jus-
tice voted in favor of the party or claim specified by the category.
Some categories contain fewer samples than others, resulting in
coarser score increments. For example, a category including ten cases
during the term will have the potential for eleven different scores
(0% through 100%, in 10% increments), while a category with only
one case during the Term will provide only two score possibilities
(0% and 100%).
B. Predictive Modeling
Data in this project were fitted to an Auto Regressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting model."' This model is useful
in circumstances where, as in this Study, a single variable (a Justice's
score) is to be forecast based only on its present and prior values with
no other explanatory variables. ARIMA is an acronym for Auto Re-
gressive Integrated Moving Average. The model is most easily ex-
plained by starting in the middle of the acronym:
Integrated: This term refers to a differencing process which oper-
ates in a manner similar to differentiation of a con-
tinuous function in calculus. The goal is simply to re-
move trend from the time series data by subtracting
each score in the time series from the next score in the
series. The resulting differences form a new time se-
ries. This operation may be repeated successively until
a trendless or "stationary" series results. Our model
employs only one differencing operation.
210. ARIMA computer modeling was accomplished using MINITAB® statistical soft-
ware with p = 1, d = 1, and q = 1. For more information regarding the ARIMA (p,d,q)
model, see PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 248-49 (1992).
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Auto-
Regression: Once the series has been made stationary, an autore-
gressive parameter may be determined."' This pa-
rameter seeks to relate each data point in the station-
ary series to the data point immediately preceding it
through multiplication. That is:
X, = AX,
where X, is the value of the data series at point t, A is the auto-
regressive parameter, and X,, is the value of the data series
point immediately preceding X,.
Because we are dealing with a series of data points, however, a
single parameter will almost never precisely produce the rela-
tionship just described for all data point pairs. Some error is in-
evitable. We therefore seek to determine that parameter which
produces the least total error when applied to the entire se-
ries.
Moving Average: A second parameter is determined that re-
lates the value of each series element X, to the error between
the estimated value and the actual value of the previous ele-
ment X,. That is:
X, = -Bx,.,
where -B is the Moving Average parameter. The value of this
parameter is also optimized to minimize its total error when ap-
plied to the series.
Synthesis: The previous operations are combined into the equa-
tion:
X, = Ax,,-Bx,.1+ E,
where E, represents the residual error remaining between the
calculated and actual values of X,. This final equation is used to
predict the series score for the upcoming Term.
211. Many statistical models employ more than one autoregressive parameter due to
various properties of the data series. Our data uses single-parameter (first order) AR and
MA models.
212. This is accomplished by applying least squares estimation, i.e., the parameter is
chosen such that the sum of the squared errors is minimized.
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C. Mean Testing
We use a "student's t test"'213 to determine whether this Term's
score (X2), departs in a statistically significant manner from the mean
of all previous Terms' scores (X,). Essentially, we treat these two
numbers as the means of two independent samples drawn from the
universe of all scores in the category."" We hypothesize that X is also
the true mean of the population p, and we set up this hypothesis (the
"null" hypothesis) and its corresponding alternative hypothesis as fol-
lows:
H: p =X, The "null" hypothesis, i.e., X does not significantly
shift p from its previous value on the real number line.
Therefore, the two samples are statistically equivalent.
Ha: p ; X, The alternative hypothesis, i.e., X significantly shifts p
from its previous value on the real number line.
Therefore, the two samples are not statistically equiva-
lent.
We then set out to prove the alternative hypothesis, within a cer-
tain confidence interval,215 by rejecting the null hypothesis.216 This is
accomplished by calculating the following statistic:
X2-Ut-
S / -n
The result of this equation (t) is compared to the entry on a t-
distribution table corresponding to the confidence interval desired (0)
and the appropriate number of degrees of freedom (n-k). 27 If the ab-
213. For a practical perspective on this procedure, see DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE P.
MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 500-18 (1993). See also
CRAIG AND HOGG, supra note 6.
214. This approach introduces potential bias problems due to non-random sampling,
small samples, and dissimilar sample standard deviations. Nevertheless, we use the test to
impose some measure of discipline in analyzing the available data.
215. We have selected a confidence interval of 95%. Because this is a two-tailed test
X 2 may shift p. in either a positive or negative direction), - =.025.
216. A full description of the logic behind this seemingly convoluted procedure is be-
yond the scope of this article. However, its purpose is to control Type I (or alpha) error.
For a complete explanation, see MOORE AND MCCABE, supra note 213.
217. k = the number of parameters being tested; here, p is the only hypothesized pa-
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solute value of t is greater than the table entry, H0 is rejected and we
say that the Justice has shown a statistically significant change in vot-
ing behavior this Term.
D. Correlation
Relationships between two Justices' voting records may be
mapped over a two-dimensional Cartesian plane as in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows a high degree of positive correlation (R2=0.7921) be-
tween the voting percentages of the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia
for the Equal Protection category. The points all fall close to an up-
ward sloping line. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that the voting
percentages of the Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens show only a very
weak, negative correlation (R2=0.0473). The points are widely scat-
tered about a downward sloping line. Statistically significant correla-
tions between and among Justices' Term-to Term voting percentages
are shown in Regression Tables 1-10. The first number in each pair is
the Pearson correlation coefficient. The second number is an r2 statis-
tic, which is a more reliable measure of the actual level of correla-
tion."'
Equal Protection Cases 0
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Figure I
rameter, so k = 1.
218. The r2 statistic is an estimate of .2, the true measure of correlation between the
dependant variable and its independent counterpart(s). The "adjusted" r2 value in the tables
is a result of the computer's attempts to filter out any bias in the original r2result.
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The correlation measured in this case is in the Term-to-Term
movement of Justices' scores. A high correlation between two Jus-
tices does not mean that they necessarily vote together often. It sim-
ply means that their scores tend to move up and down together from
one Term to another. Also note that correlation in no way implies
causation.
E. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis has long been used by psychologists who attempt
to identify characteristics of personality or intelligence by using bat-
teries of tests. Their challenge has been to develop tests that validly
measure the characteristics of interest. This Study similarly attempts
to measure the Justices' liberal and conservative leanings by "testing"
their disposition of certain types of cases.
We performed a factor analysis of the Study categories using
Minitab software. The factor loadings presented were obtained by
extracting a single factor, using principal components analysis and
applying a QMAX rotation to the data. A full description of the the-
ory and mathematics underlying factor analysis is beyond the scope of
this appendix, but several books on the subject are available that pro-
vide reasonably simple explanations of this complex process." 9
F. Frontier Analysis
Frontier analysis can probably best be described with an exam-
ple. Suppose four individuals are competing for the title of "world's
greatest athlete." Their scores in two events are listed in the follow-
219. See generally Dennis Child, The Essentials of Factor Analysis (2d ed. 1990).
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Alan would argue that the title should go to the best croquet
player because he has scored highest in the croquet category, while
Debbie would argue that the best marbles player should win because
each has scored highest in that category. On the other hand, Betty
would argue that each sport should receive equal weight, because her
combined score with equal weightings would be higher than either
Alan's or Debbie's, i.e., Betty would score (7 x 0.5) + (7 x 0.5) = 7,
while Alan would score (9 x 0.5) + (2 x 0.5) = 5.5, Chuck would score











A, B, C, and D represent the athletes. The solid line connecting
points A, B, and D represents the athletic frontier, i.e., the boundary
beyond which no athlete has performed regardless of the relative
weights assigned to marbles and croquet. A, B, and D are located at
100% of the frontier. Moreover, B can be said to be super-efficient to
the extent her point lies beyond the line AD connecting the two
points adjacent to it on the frontier. A and D are also super-efficient
to the extent they lie beyond lines (not shown) connecting B with the
points at which the frontier meets each axis. C falls short of the fron-
tier regardless of the weights assigned to marbles and croquet. How-
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ever, an optimal set of weights may be selected such that C "looks his
best," i.e., he comes closest to reaching the frontier.
The same concept can be applied to the Court to determine
which Justice is "most conservative" or "most liberal." However, in-
stead of two dimensions (croquet and marbles), the Court analysis in-
cludes nine dimensions (all Study categories except Swing Votes).
Although human minds have difficulty envisioning nine dimensions,
computers can handle the required calculations with ease. We per-
formed our analysis using Microsoft Excel's solver feature. Although
the formulas and procedures involved are straightforward, a complete
220description of them is beyond the scope of this appendix.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
APPENDIX C
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)
McConnell was an exceptionally difficult case to tabulate this
Term - perhaps the most difficult case encountered in the 18 years
of this Study. We set out this detailed explanatory footnote to dem-
onstrate how the established parameters of the Study were used to
tabulate the results from McConnell.
In order to accurately capture the voting patterns determinative
of the numerous precise questions decided in McConnell, we first
identified the specific "questions" addressed by the voting coalitions
on the Court. We found 19 such questions, listed below. Some ques-
tions were tabulated on more than one Table. (For example, the first
question is properly included on Table 5, First Amendment and Table
2, Civil Cases, Federal Government versus a Private Party.) The par-
enthetical after each question sets out the Tables on which each ques-
tion was initially tabulated: (1A) = 1st Amendment, (J) = Jurisdiction,
(FCP) = Federal Civil Party. We found 14 First Amendment ques-
tions, 5 Jurisdiction questions, and 19 Federal Civil Party questions.
1. Are the provisions of FECA Sections 323(a), (b), (d), (f) con-
stitutional? (1A)(FCP)
2. Is FECA Section 323(3) constitutional? (1A)(FCP)
3. Are the disclosure requirements of Section 201 of the BCRA
constitutional as applied to executory contracts? (1A)(FCP)
4. Are the disclosure requirements of Section 201 of the BCRA
constitutional outside the context of executory contracts? (1A)(FCP)
5. Are the disclosure requirements of Section 202 of the BCRA
as applied to coordinated communications with a candidate constitu-
tional? (1A)(FCP)
6. Are the disclosure requirements of Section 202 of the BCRA
as applied to coordinated communications with a political party con-
stitutional? (1A)(FCP)
7. Is FECA Section 616(b)(2) constitutional? (1A)(FCP)
8. Is FECA Section 316( c)(6) constitutional? (1A)(FCP)
9. Is the dispute regarding the disclosures required by Section
212 of the BCRA relating to executory contracts ripe for decision? (J)
(FCP)
10. Are the disclosures required by Section 212 of the BCRA re-
lating to executory contracts constitutional? (1A)(FCP)
[Vol. 32:3
Spring 2005] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR 845
11. Is Section 213 of the BCRA constitutional? (1A)(FCP)
12. Is Section 214 of the BCRA constitutional? (1A)(FCP)
13. Do plaintiffs have standing to challenge Section 305 of the
BCRA? (J)(FCP)
14. Do plaintiffs have standing to challenge Section 307 of the
BCRA? (J)(FCP)
15. Do plaintiffs have standing to challenge Sections 304, 316,
319 of the BCRA? (J)(FCP)
16. Is Section 311 of the BCRA constitutional? (1A)(FCP)
17. Is Section 318 of the BCRA's prohibition on contributions by
minors constitutional? (1A)(FCP)
18. Does the FEC have standing to intervene? (J)(FCP)
19. Is Section 504 of the BCRA constitutional? (1A)(FCP)
The voting patterns displayed on these questions were sometimes
identical. For example, the "conservative/liberal" pattern displayed
on questions 1, 3, 6-10, 12 and 19 were identical. (See definitional
rule three: "a case is included more than once on the same table if it
raises two or more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case
and the issues are resolved by different voting alignments.") Applica-
tion of this rule resulted in six discrete voting patterns being tabulated
on the final results for Tables 2, 5 and 8. These voting patterns, la-
beled A through F, are set out below:
Pattern A: questions 1, 3, 6-10, 12 and 19 (Swing vote: Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, O'Connor, Souter, Stevens)
Pattern B: questions 2, 4, 5
Pattern C: questions 11, 17, 18
Pattern D: question 13
Pattern E: question 14, 15
Pattern F: question 16
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The final tabulation sheet for McConnell, accordingly, looked
like this:
For Gov't Against ForClaim Against
For
Claim Against
Ginsbur A,B,E,F C,D C A,B,F C,D E
KenneC B.+FC A, Bfl D
O'Connor A,B,D,E,F C C A,B,F C D,E
Scalia D,E,F A,B,C A,B,C F C D,E
Stevens A,B,E,F CD C A,B,F C,D E
Tho____ WDT AC i )
Vote Conservative Liberal Liberal Cons. Liberal Cons.
